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Abstract 
With the continuing expansion of global economic integration, labor standards in developing 
countries have become a hot button issue.  One result has been a proliferation of efforts to use 
the market to put pressure directly on multinational corporations to improve wages and 
working conditions in their overseas operations and to insist that their suppliers do so as well.  
This paper analyzes the dynamics of these efforts in terms of a 'market for standards' in which 
consumers, stimulated by human rights activists, demand that corporations improve working 
conditions in supplier factories.  The paper presents evidence that such a consumer demand 
exists and analyzes the incentives corporations face to respond to it.  It examines the nature of 
the critical intermediary role played by activists in stimulating consumer demands and 
assesses the outcomes in the major anti-sweatshop campaigns of the 1990s.  The paper also 
addresses the limitations of such consumer-based campaigns and the concern expressed by 
some that these activist campaigns may do more harm than good, by deterring investment in 
and trade with poor countries. It concludes with an overall assessment of when ‘doing good’ 
actually does good. 
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Introduction 
 
 Labor standards in less developed countries became a hot button issue in discussions of 
trade and economic development in the 1990s. Standards rose to the top of the public agenda not 
because workers were unionizing in mass numbers nor because management had turned over a 
moral leaf nor because the International Labor Organization had asserted itself in the global 
economy. Labor standards came to the fore because non-governmental groups in advanced 
countries – the human rights vigilantes of our title – galvanized consumers to demand that 
multinational firms and their suppliers improve working conditions and pay living wages in 
developing countries. 
 How did human rights vigilantes bring labor standards to the center of public discourse? 
Will the anti-sweatshop activists create a permanent global movement for workers rights or will 
public interest dissipate over time? Can concerned citizens in advanced countries pressure firms 
to improve the economic condition of workers in poorer countries or will their activities 
inadvertently make things worse? Which appellation best characterizes the human rights 
vigilantes – white hats or Don Quixotes? 
 We analyze these questions in terms of a “market for standards” in which consumers, 
stimulated by vigilante intermediaries, demand that corporations improve working conditions in 
supplier factories. Section 1 presents evidence that a consumer demand for minimum labor 
standards exists and explores the nature of that demand. Section 2 examines the incentives that 
exist for firms to respond to this demand and considers how industry structure influences the 
nature of the response. Section 3 introduces the human rights activists of our title and assesses 
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their role as intermediaries who expose sweatshop abuses and trigger consumers to demand 
changes in corporate behavior. Section 4 examines the major anti-sweatshop campaigns of the 
1990s and their achievements. Section 5 considers the arguments that anti-sweatshop campaigns 
risk doing more harm than good by raising costs and deterring investment in poor countries; and 
assesses the limitations of activist consumer-based campaigns. Section 6 concludes with a 
summary of our conclusions as to when and how human rights vigilante efforts actually do good. 
1  Consumer Demand for Labor Standards 
 “[I] had a hard time making up my mind how bad a company had to be before I could 
bring myself to give its products the old heave-ho.” – Joe Queenan, My Goodness 
  “I still shop at those brand-name stores, but I feel really guilty about it.” –Founding 
member of a New York City high school Student Committee Against Labor Exploitation 
(Business Week, September 11, 2000) 
 The sine qua non of activist efforts to improve labor standards around the world is that 
consumers care about the conditions of the workers who make the items they consume. If 
consumers do not care or do not associate the conditions with their consumption, human rights 
vigilantes could not pressure firms to improve working conditions. The extent to which 
consumers care and their willingness to act on their concerns is, as the above commentator 
indicates, uncertain. Indeed, many consumers, like the high school student above, would just as 
soon not know about poor conditions since that knowledge reduces the utility of their 
consumption. Activists inform consumers about the conditions of production in ways that 
resonate with moral concerns, and develop campaigns to turn concern into improvements. From 
this perspective, the activists are entrepreneurs who identify latent market demands and find 
ways to meet those demands.  
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 In this section we present survey evidence that consumers care about labor standards and 
will buy products made under better conditions in preference to those made under worse 
conditions. That many corporations respond to the activist-induced pressures, at least 
rhetorically, shows that they believe such a demand exists.  
 Survey evidence 
 You are offered two identical t-shirts with your favorite logo. One was made in good 
conditions in some third world country. The other was made in a fire-trap factory by people paid 
near starvation wages. Which t-shirt would you buy ... when the t-shirts cost the same? ... when 
the shirt made under good conditions costs a bit more? 
 Surveys that ask questions of this form invariably find that the vast majority of people 
report they would choose the garment made under better conditions, even if it cost a bit more. 
Exhibit 1 summarizes the results from surveys undertaken by Marymount University’s Center 
for Ethical Concerns; by the University of Maryland’s Program on International Policy 
Attitudes; and by our project. 
 The Marymount surveys were conducted in 1995, 1996, and 1999. In each survey, three 
of four consumers said they would avoid shopping in a store if they knew the goods were 
produced under bad conditions while not quite two of three say they would be more inclined to 
shop in stores combating sweatshops. The greater response to knowledge about bad conditions 
than good conditions suggests that consumers respond more to information that reduces their 
utility than to information that increases it -- consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory that shows people weigh potential losses more heavily than potential gains. An 
average 85 percent of respondents in the Marymount survey said they would pay $1 more for a 
$20 item if they could be assured that it was made under good conditions. 
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 The 1999 Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) survey presented arguments 
for and against making labor standards part of the trade agenda (University of Maryland 2000). 
By covering a spectrum of trade-related issues, this survey put attitudes toward labor standards 
into a broader context. The survey found that most Americans favor linking labor standards to 
trade. Roughly three of four respondents said they felt a moral obligation to try to help workers 
faced with poor conditions and approximately the same proportion reported that they would pay 
$5 more for a $20 garment if they knew it was not made in a sweatshop.1  Most respondents 
found convincing arguments for minimum standards -- that harsh conditions are immoral and 
that standards eliminate unfair advantage through exploitation -- while far fewer were convinced 
by arguments against standards -- that they reduce jobs in affected countries and impinge on 
national sovereignty. 
 People also differentiated among labor standards. More were concerned about child labor 
and safe conditions than about the right to unionize. Most consumers did not expect workers in 
foreign countries to earn US wages (82 percent) and just over half favored lowering trade 
barriers after being informed about the costs of protectionism. This compares to only 36 percent 
who favored lowering barriers to clothing imports absent the information. Two-thirds favored 
free trade as long as society recompensed workers whose livelihood was hurt by trade, say with 
adjustment assistance and training. Nearly 90 percent said that “free trade is an important goal 
for the United States, but it should be balanced with other goals, such as protecting workers, the 
environment, and human rights—even if this may mean slowing the growth of trade and the 
economy.” 
 Most striking, the largest majority on any trade question (93 percent) agreed that 
“countries that are part of international trade agreements should be required to maintain 
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minimum standards for working conditions.” Thus, Americans support international labor 
standards in both their private consumption behavior and in the public sphere. 
Our survey 
 To illuminate further the consumer demand for labor standards, we surveyed a small 
number of randomly chosen persons in the United States in fall 1999.2  The survey used a split 
sample design that posed different questions to different respondents to see whether responses 
varied with the wording or presentation of questions. The results parallel those of the 
Marymount and PIPA surveys. Most respondents said that they cared about the treatment of the 
workers who made the clothing they bought and that they would be willing to pay more for an 
item if they knew it was made under good working conditions (see exhibit 1). On average, 
consumers said that they were willing to pay 28 percent more on a $10 item and 15 percent more 
on a $100 item (including as zeros consumers who said that they were unwilling to pay extra for 
the assurance). Eighty-four percent of a different sub-sample said that they would purchase a 
different t-shirt rather than one “with a nice logo” that local students said was made under poor 
labor conditions. Nearly two-thirds said that they would not buy the t-shirt made under poor 
conditions at any price.3  The third who said they would buy it if the price was lowered wanted a 
mean discount of $4.38. On the other side, consumers said that they would pay an average of just 
$0.87 for knowing the product was made under good conditions (including 0s for persons who 
said they would not pay the extra amount, or who refused to answer).4 The greater response to 
the utility-reducing information about bad conditions than to the utility-increasing information 
about good conditions again fits with prospect theory. 
 At the heart of any economic analysis of consumer tastes is the demand curve --  the 
relation between the number of consumers who would buy products at different prices. Our 
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survey allows us to estimate the demand curve for labor standards, taking account of the 
potential difference in responsiveness to products made under good conditions and those made 
under bad conditions. We asked some respondents “how much more would you be willing to pay 
for items made under good working conditions” for items worth $10 and $100. We asked others 
if they would buy a $10 t-shirt made under poor conditions if its price was lowered to $9 ... $8 ... 
$7 ..., and how much they would pay for the t-shirt if it was made under good conditions.  
 Panels A-C of Exhibit 2 show that both designs give qualitatively similar results: high 
elasticities of demand for products made under good conditions but low elasticities of demand 
for products made under bad conditions.5  The willingness to pay for items made under good 
conditions has elasticities ranging from -3.7 to -4.9. The 20 percent to 30 percent of consumers 
who are unwilling to pay anything extra produce an immediate loss in revenue that these 
estimates indicate cannot be recovered from those willing to pay more. In addition, there is a 
sharp drop-off in purchases as the price of the item rises. By contrast, roughly two of three 
consumers say they would not buy the item made under bad conditions under any circumstance 
and the demand for t-shirts produced under bad conditions is inelastic (-0.29) among the third 
who said they would buy them at a discount. 
 The implication is that firms can lose greatly from having their products identified as 
being made under bad conditions but have only limited space to raise prices for products made 
under good conditions -- unless consumers see competing products as made under bad 
conditions.6  The differential consumer response to information about good and bad conditions 
helps explain, we argue later, the behavior of activists and firms in the market for standards. 
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Do consumers act as they say?
Readers may question whether people will do what they say on a survey. Economists 
want to see behavior not intentions. The best way to find out how many people would in fact pay 
extra for a product made under good conditions is to conduct a “Standards Experiment,” by 
offering the product for sale along side a similar product with no or negative information on 
working conditions, and seeing what happens. Unfortunately, no one has done this.7  But 
experimental data and market behavior in other domains suggests that people care enough about 
the conditions of others to behave as they say they would in the surveys. 
 The Dictator’s Game is perhaps the experimental economics game closest to the 
standards problem. Two players are given envelopes. One has $100 in it while the other 
envelope has $0. The person with the $100 can simply keep the money and say tough kazoo to 
the person who got $0. The economically rational decision is to do just that. But behavior is 
different. Only about 20 percent of players keep all the money. The vast majority share some 
with their unlucky partner, albeit offering less than if the second player could veto the division 
(as in the “Ultimatum Game”). Another game that comes close to the standards problem is the 
Lost Wallet Game (Charness, Haruvy, and Sonsino 2000). One person finds a wallet, which has 
more value to its owner than to the finder. The owner may or may not give a reward for finding 
the wallet. The greater the value of the wallet to the owner relative to the finder, the more likely 
is it that the finder will return it, even though this will mean less money than if the finder kept 
the wallet. The implication is that people gain some utility from being “fair” to someone who 
values something more than themselves.8  Thus, at least in laboratory situations, people behave in 
ways that lend believability to the responses from surveys on standards and purchasing behavior. 
 Going outside the laboratory, the fact that people contribute to charity and volunteer time 
for charitable activities shows that they sacrifice income for social goals. Charitable giving and 
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volunteering is greater in the US than in other advanced countries, presumably because the US 
does not have a large welfare state. In the charitable sector, moreover, much giving and 
volunteering comes in response to requests from activists (Freeman 1997). Again, people behave 
as if they care for more than their own immediate consumption and thus could be expected to 
consider labor standards in their purchase of goods, as they say they would in surveys. 
 Finally, the response of many companies to allegations of worker mistreatment also 
suggests that consumers act in accord with survey responses. If consumers did not care about 
conditions, firms would simply ignore the allegations as irrelevant to their bottom lines. Firm 
behavior is also consistent with the finding that consumer demand for good and bad conditions is 
asymmetric since, as we will document shortly, firms rarely address labor standards issues unless 
forced to do so by bad publicity. Inelastic consumer demand for goods produced under abusive 
conditions gives companies an incentive to respond to negative publicity, elastic demand for 
“worker-friendly” products means that firms see little advantage in marketing their products on 
that basis unless it costs them little or nothing to do so. 
2 Firms and the Market for Labor Standards 
 “Their image is everything. They live or die by their image. That gives you a certain 
power over them.”--Charles Kernaghan, National Labor Committee (The New York Times, June 
18, 1996) 
 Some well-known firms have responded to activist campaigns alleging that they or their 
subcontractors mistreat workers. Levi’s adopted the first code addressing sweatshop issues after 
allegations of abuse among its suppliers in Saipan. Wal-Mart followed after its products were 
linked to child labor in Bangladesh. Nike initially rejected responsibility for conditions in its 
supplier factories but then took steps to improve conditions in order to blunt unceasing criticism 
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from activists. Alternatively, Reebok has tried to avoid being tarred by the same brush as Nike 
by creating a human rights award to honor activists fighting for democracy and against child 
labor and other abuses. Critics argue that Reebok is hypocritical and has done little to upgrade 
working conditions in its factories but, so far, the strategy has worked since activists have not 
targeted Reebok as aggressively as they have Nike. 
 Allegations of sweatshop abuse generally arise in the apparel and footwear sectors, which 
are labor-intensive, geographically mobile, and highly price-competitive (ILO 2000). Companies 
in these sectors focus on product design and marketing, while contracting out most or all of the 
actual production. Large retailers with a prominent market presence, such as Wal-Mart and The 
Gap, or firms with high brand name recognition and recognizable logos, such as Nike and 
Levi’s, are the most vulnerable to activist campaigns since they sell their “image”, which can be 
tarnished by campaigns. Indeed, Klein (1999) argues that these companies are the victims of 
their own success because they increasingly base their marketing not on the utility of the 
products they sell, but on the “statement” the product makes about the person consuming it. In 
addition, many of the targeted firms market heavily to teenagers and young adults, where 
demand for branded clothing and footwear is often faddish. No one wants the statement they 
make by wearing Nike shoes or Gap jeans to be that they are indifferent to young women their 
age or younger slaving in a stifling factory for 12 hours a day. If it becomes gauche to wear a 
given label’s apparel because it was made in a sweatshop, retailers could lose sales quickly. Nor 
does it matter to the corporation whether the motivation is genuine concern for the workers who 
make the product or simply the desire to be cool with one’s friends. In either case, “Brand image, 
the source of so much corporate wealth, is also, it turns out, the corporate Achilles’ heel” (Klein 
1999, 343). 
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 The apparel industry has also moved to “lean retailing,” which affects the response to 
anti-sweatshop campaigns. Going lean means holding low inventories of existing products and 
using information technology to tailor items to market preferences as quickly possible (Weil 
2000). This makes potential supply disruptions, say because of revelations of child labor in a 
contract facility, especially costly to firms. The premium on speed and the advantages of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement and other hemispheric trade preferences has led US 
apparel firms to source more production in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America., which 
also makes it easier for activists to uncover abuses. 
 Offsetting the incentives to act preemptively are the costs of enforcing higher labor 
standards, which the consumer surveys suggest will be difficult to fully pass on. In addition to 
any direct costs of improving working conditions, the US retailer must also pay for monitoring 
compliance throughout its supply chain. That means monitoring thousands of contractors around 
the world, who may, in turn, subcontract jobs to thousands more, including home workers in 
some cases. Exhibit 3 shows the chain of production for infant and children’s apparel between 
one US retailer, JC Penney, and workers in one country, the Philippines. Through this chain JC 
Penney contracts with over 2,000 suppliers in more than 80 countries. And this is not unusual. 
Nordstrom has over 50,000 contractors and subcontractors, while the National Labor Committee 
estimates that Walmart has used 1,000 factories just in China and that Disney licenses products 
in over 30,000 factories around the world. 
The firm’s response to campaigns 
 Given an anti-sweatshop campaign, how will a profit-maximizing retailer or marketer 
respond?9   Absent a campaign, we assume that the firm cares nothing about labor standards and 
leaves it to the contractor to balance the costs of improved work conditions against the potential 
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productivity gains. This gives the starting level of standards So. An activist campaign forces 
firms to re-assess the costs of supplying standards against the potential loss of consumer 
demand. Increasing standards means that the firm will require contractors to abide by a code of 
higher minimum standards and monitor compliance. 
 Exhibit 4 shows how a campaign can change the price that consumers will pay for a 
product, and the cost per unit of product of raising standards to different levels. Absent a 
campaign to inform consumers about conditions, the firm charges Po while producing at base 
level standards So. A campaign that fails to engage consumers, such as the unsuccessful effort 
against Disney, leaves the price unchanged. By contrast, a successful campaign reduces the price 
the firm gets for producing under bad conditions and raises the price if they produce under good 
conditions. On the basis of our survey results, we assume that the slope of the price curve is 
kinked around the level of standards, S*, that consumers would accept. Firms suffer large 
reductions in price for below-S* standards but gain only modestly from above-S* standards. 
 Given the new price curve that the campaign has produced, the firm will assess the 
benefits and costs of raising standards. In the exhibit the cost curve starts at 0 and then rises 
linearly. The firm maximizes profits by picking the level of standards where the price received 
for the good inclusive of standards most exceeds the cost of standards. With curve C1, the costs 
of improving standards are so high they cannot be recovered so the firm will not raise standards. 
In this situation the activist campaign has failed in two ways. It has failed to raise standards and 
it has probably reduced the employment or earnings of workers in contract facilities because the 
firm will reduce orders since it makes less money. 
 With cost curve C2, by contrast, the maximum profit occurs at the kink point.10  The 
campaign has attained its goal S* by presenting the firm with a stark choice: fail to meet S* and 
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suffer price cuts to sell the same amount (or alternatively, suffer reductions in sales at the same 
price) or enforce higher standards throughout their supply chain with only modest possible gains 
in price. 
 Finally, with cost curve C3, the firm will produce standards in excess of the kink point. 
Here the marginal cost of standards is so modest that the firm can potentially make more money 
by producing high standards than it did before the campaign. For example, a firm that improved 
health and safety among its suppliers, as Nike and Reebok did by moving to water-based 
adhesives in shoe production, might publicize this in its advertisements, potentially gaining extra 
sales while also lowering injury rates and improving worker effort or morale. 
 The diagram directs attention to three determinants of the success of activist campaigns: 
the cost of producing the standards; the level of standards at which the price curve changes 
shape; and the twist in the price schedule when consumer concerns are stimulated. The 
asymmetry in demand reflected in the price schedule explains why activists emphasize 
transparency of information while firms try to control information about conditions as tightly as 
possible. Information about bad conditions is highly costly, while information about good 
conditions raises revenues only modestly. This means that full disclosure of the location of 
plants and independent monitoring of compliance with standards become issues of conflict. If 
consumers responded more to information about good conditions, activists and firms would have 
common ground on which to work. 
 But the activists also face a dilemma in their campaigns. On one side, to rouse interest, 
activists must highlight the evils of low labor standards and stress how far current standards are 
from S*, or some higher value the activists seek. On the other side, they need business and 
governments to improve conditions, which requires some compromise with these groups. If 
 14
activists are too moderate or compromise too readily, they will not gain the support of 
consumers. But if their demands are too radical, they will alienate business and government. By 
being either too “soft” or too “hard” activists can fail, since in either case firms will get greater 
profit from maintaining standards than from working with suppliers to upgrade them. 
 In sum, consumer demand for labor standards represents concerns that can readily show 
up in the marketplace. But since consumers have no direct information about the conditions of 
work, their demand for standards is a latent one that would typically remain beneath the surface 
but for the work of the human rights vigilantes. The vigilante activists are catalytic agents, 
stimulating consumers through their campaigns, and pressuring firms to improve conditions. 
Without them, there would be no anti-sweatshop movement. 
3 Who Are the Vigilantes? 
 “The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for not by the 
labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom has given the 
control of the property interests of the country.”  – George F. Baer, President, Anthracite Coal 
Trust, 1902 (quoted in Marchand 1998, p. 42) 
 “Clothing bearing our university logos ought to be produced under healthy, safe and fair 
working conditions” USAS, College Clothes From the Concrete Prison, July 1999, p 1 
 Human rights vigilantes are self-appointed advocates, motivated by moral concerns, 
rather than elected representatives of workers, employers, or consumers. They are a varied 
group, with differing expertise and modes of operation. In a 1999 directory of US anti-sweatshop 
organizations, Global Exchange listed 40 different groups involved in anti-sweatshop campaigns 
in the United States. Web search yielded several additional groups, including some outside the 
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clothing area (coffee farmers, rug makers), as well as groups outside the United States. A more 
extensive search would undoubtedly yield many more. 
 Appendix A lists 43 US-based groups identified from these sources. Most are small 
rather than mass membership organizations, and most are relatively new. Slightly more than half 
were formed in the 1990s and nearly 80 percent have existed only since 1980. Most groups 
concentrate on a particular group of workers, either geographically, ethnically, or by industry or 
company. Some groups started as anti-apartheid campaigners while several formed to protest 
human rights abuses and American policy toward repressive regimes in Central American. For 
these groups, anti-sweatshop campaigns are the next phase in their fight for peace and social 
justice. 
 The groups constitute an ecology with varying orientations from moderate to militant. 
Some have a religious base -- the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility, which was a 
key actor in the efforts to reduce foreign investment in South Africa, and the NY State Labor-
Religion Coalition are cases in point. Others, such as the National Labor Committee (NLC) and 
United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), have an activist-left orientation. Yet others such 
as Verite, an organization that monitors conditions of subcontractors for firms, or Co-op 
America, are apolitical do-gooders. As the groups vary along many dimensions, the 
classification in Appendix A is by no means perfect. 
 These organizations also play a variety of roles in the “market for standards.”  Some, like 
Corporate Watch or Jeff Ballinger’s Press for Change, focus on providing information about 
abuses. Some seek out other key players to negotiate standards and a few provide monitoring 
services. Some groups are vertically integrated, like the Council on Economic Priorities, which 
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negotiated a standard with various stakeholders and created an agency to oversee enforcement, 
and the International Labor Rights Fund, which plays a role in all three functions. 
 Morton Winston (forthcoming) of the College of New Jersey and Amnesty International  
has categorized the groups into Confronters –  who take a confrontational and adversarial 
approach to corporations in the belief that only the threat of reduced profits will induce them to 
improve conditions; and Engagers, who seek to persuade firms to do “the right thing”. While the 
two groups often appear to be at loggerheads, in fact both are necessary for the market for 
standards to function. Confronters keep consumers riled up with their exposes, and gain support 
by generating strong campaigns. But they cannot readily compromise with firms and, therefore, 
find it difficult to point consumers to acceptable alternatives. Engagers broker agreements with 
firms but risk losing credibility by compromising with “the enemy”. Without the confronters, 
firms, governments, and international agencies could easily ignore moderate desires for 
improved standards. Without the moderates firms, governments, and agencies would declare it 
impossible to meet militant demands and would reject them out of hand. 
 Thus, we have a classic mixed strategy type game. In equilibrium, there should be an 
evolutionarily stable strategy division of activists between the two groups. When the marginal 
return to confrontation is higher, more activists should adopt a confrontation strategy; when the 
marginal return to engagement is higher, more activists should adopt that strategy until the 
marginal returns from each are equated. In the current phase of the movement, however, Winston 
(forthcoming) points to the risk of a backlash among corporations if confronters refuse to 
recognize progress, relentlessly criticize corporations that inevitably fall short, and “ensure that 
no good deed goes unpunished.”  Fear of becoming a target can then deter a company from 
taking even the first steps toward adopting a code or allowing external monitoring. 
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 Among confronters, the NLC has been highly effective due to the skills of Charles 
Kernaghan and to luck in the form of the Kathie Lee Gifford case, which we summarize shortly. 
Global Exchange has also generated considerable media attention with its campaigns in favor of 
“fair trade” and against unfettered globalization more broadly. In terms of providing “muscle” 
for campaigns, church and student groups are the most important. Religious groups link anti-
sweat activities to congregations while the United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS) has 
spurred students around the country to protest poor labor standards related to college licensed 
products. Student activism has in fact taken center-stage in the anti-sweatshop movement, as 
USAS has successfully pressured companies to make public the names and locations of 
subcontractors and spearheaded the Worker Rights Consortium. 
The student activists 
 The growth of anti-sweatshop activism among students has been sudden and sharp – an 
example of the spurt phenomenon that often characterizes social movements (Freeman 1999). In 
1995 there was no student anti-sweatshop movement in the United States. The AFL-CIO’s first 
Union Summer in 1996 generated some student interest, but it was the Union of Needletrades, 
Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE) that did most to catalyze student anti-sweatshop 
activity. UNITE hired a young bachelor’s graduate, Ginny Coughlin, to coordinate their anti-
sweatshop activity in 1995. Two years later, the union hired 11 summer interns, all of whom had 
been active in a campaign against Guess jeans, to work on anti-sweatshop activities. One intern, 
Tico Almeida, returned to his campus, Duke, and initiated an anti-sweatshop campaign. When 
Duke agreed to demands that the university insist that its licensees produce items under safe 
working conditions, with freedom to organize, and independent monitoring, The New York Times 
carried the story (March 8, 1998, A16). In spring 1998, at a conference in New York, 50 students 
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involved in university-based anti-sweatshop campaigns started USAS . Their major demand was 
that the Collegiate Licensing Company, the licensing agent for some 160 universities, implement 
stronger codes of conduct for its suppliers. By 2000, USAS had chapters on nearly 140 
campuses, ranging from highly elite universities with a tradition of student protest to small 
liberal arts schools.  
 What kinds of students become involved in anti-sweatshop activities? How much time 
and effort do they give to anti-sweatshop campaigning? What motivates their efforts? To answer 
these questions we surveyed nearly 100 USAS members in summer 1999.11 Forty-two percent of 
our sample classified themselves as leaders and 31 percent viewed themselves as critical people 
in their campus anti-sweatshop activities. Nearly three-fourths said they had helped initiate or 
participate in their local campus campaign. In terms of demographics, the sample is divided 
nearly evenly between men (53 percent) and women (47 percent) and is dominated by whites (84 
percent) and non-black minorities (15 percent). Seventy-five percent of the activists are social 
science majors (some joint majors), usually sociology or political science; 18 percent were 
humanities majors and the remaining 7 percent were science or mathematics majors. 
 Panel A of exhibit 5 shows the family background of student activists. Many come from 
relatively well-to-do families: 36 percent report their family income as exceeding $100,000 -- 
more than twice the 16 percent of all first year college students with that family income; while 
just 8 percent report a family income of less than $40,000 compared to 35 percent of first year 
college students. The parents of activists are more progressive than most Americans, and many 
parents are themselves activists. As a result of this concordance of attitudes, the activist students 
receive considerable support from their parents. In fact, among parents the proportion who 
support student activists exceeded the proportion critical of their activity by more than among 
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professors or friends of the students not involved in the anti-sweatshop movement. These student 
activists are not Lewis Feuer’s generation rebelling against their parents. Rather, they are the 
product of a generational transmission of political attitudes and activity. 
 Panel B of exhibit 5 shows that the students have a history of activism. Over half were 
involved in campaigns in high school, and 84 percent had done activist work prior to their 
involvement with USAS. Nearly a third had been members of trade unions and 9 percent had 
been involved in Union Summer. The vast majority viewed themselves as politically committed 
activists rather than as apolitical do-gooders. Indicative of their values, the activists said that 
raising the well-being of third world workers and greater unionization in the United States would 
make them happier than getting all A’s in their classes. 
 Panel C shows the time students gave to the anti-sweatshop campaign, to other extra-
curricular activities, and to their studies. The activist students spend about 6 hours a week on 
anti-sweatshop work, with a small number giving over 20 hours a week to the campaign. In 
addition, the activists spend 13 hours on other extra-curricular activities, so that their total time 
spent on non-academic pursuits exceeds the time spent studying. Forty per cent hold jobs and 
work around 11 hours per week. Nearly half say that if they were not involved in the anti-
sweatshop movement, they would devote the time to another cause. The final panel of exhibit 5 
shows that students see the main cost of activism as lower grades, but they see little effect on 
their romantic life, and believe that their activism has increased their self-confidence, and 
communication and leadership skills. 
 Exhibit 6 compares the attitudes of student activists to those of first year college students 
in the UCLA/ACE annual American Freshman survey on identical questions.12  The activists are 
more “liberal” than freshmen on most issues: they have a more open view toward sex, are less 
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likely to believe that race discrimination is a thing of the past, and are more likely to believe that 
the wealthy should pay more taxes. At the same time, they are more tolerant of views with which 
they disagree – only 38 percent believe that colleges should prohibit racist or sexist speech 
compared to 64 percent of all freshmen. The activists are also more favorable to disobeying laws 
when the laws contravene their convictions and more likely to believe that individual actions can 
change society. Finally, the activists are markedly less interested in being well off financially or 
in raising a family than the freshmen and more interested in influencing political outcomes and 
becoming community leaders. In short, their attitudes show that they are indeed “listening to a 
different drummer” than other college students. 
 
4 What Activists Produce: Campaigns 
 “Look, I don’t have time to be some kind of major political activist every time I go to the 
mall. Just tell me what kind of shoes are okay to buy, okay?”  --Teenage girl, St. Mary’s 
Secondary School, Pickering Ontario (Klein 2000, 399) 
 Human rights vigilantes produce campaigns for labor standards in the global economy. In 
so doing, they hope to stimulate the concerns reflected in this young woman’s statement and help 
her find “okay shoes.” Their targets are simultaneously consumers like her and the corporations 
that sell her shoes. The tools they use in their campaigns are the same as those used by other 
international advocacy networks to pressure targeted actors to change:  information politics, 
symbolic politics, accountability politics, and leverage politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 16-25). 
Most anti-sweatshop campaigns explicitly combine elements of the first three. Over time, the 
cumulative effect of many campaigns allows activists to leverage their influence with 
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governments and international institutions such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), 
which have greater resources to act against sweatshop abuses. 
 The first challenge facing an anti-sweatshop campaign is to obtain accurate, credible 
information about labor conditions in factories producing brand name goods. Getting such 
information is difficult, given the long production chains that often link manufacturers or 
retailers to workers in less developed countries (exhibit 3; Verite). In addition, managers of 
export processing zones and unsympathetic authoritarian governments often restrict access to 
facilities, making information-gathering in some cases even more difficult (Klein 1999, 203-04; 
212-13). 
 The second challenge is to package the information in a way that strikes a moral chord 
among consumers and generates enough publicity to put labor conditions on the public agenda. 
This is also no easy task. Human rights vigilantes do not have large PR budgets nor automatic 
access to major media. In a world plagued by catastrophes, wars, and multiple injustices, they 
compete for attention with other compelling issues as well as with the weekly entertainment, 
sports, and scandal reports. Often this means that the campaigns need to personalize the message 
through a spokesperson who becomes the symbol of exploitation or through the closeness 
between the consumer and the product, as with college logo products. The type of abuse 
highlighted also matters, with child labor and unsafe working conditions attracting more 
sympathy than restrictions on union activities. 
 A campaign that succeeds in the first two tasks must then get firms or governments to 
undertake corrective policies. The typical firm’s first response to a campaign is to claim 
ignorance; then it will announce it has developed a code to prevent such occurrences in the 
future. In most cases, however, the firm resists independent monitoring of code compliance, 
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which might force it to expend real resources. This is the point where activists turn to 
accountability politics, using the firm’s own promises to pressure them to follow words with 
deeds. Writing about the corporate responsibility movement, William Greider commented, “An 
enduring truth, a wise friend once explained to me, is that important social change nearly always 
begins in hypocrisy” (The Nation, October 2, 2000). Thus, anti-sweat campaigns usually must 
generate several rounds of publicity and pressure to have any hope of producing a change in 
behavior.  
 At this writing, the anti-sweat activists have exposed bad conditions in some factories 
and elicited promises of reform but have shied away from pointing consumers to shoes and 
sweatshirts that are “okay.” Activists are cautious here for two reasons. First, a campaign that 
reduces sales will harm the very workers the campaigns are designed to help, so activists 
generally eschew calls for consumers to boycott products. Second, if activists endorse a given 
product, and someone finds that somewhere in the world the firm or one of its subcontractors 
workers is abusing workers (highly likely given the long supply chains), the activists risk losing 
their credibility. 
The 1990s anti-sweatshop campaigns 
 Sweatshops have characterized apparel production since industrial revolution days, and 
so too have campaigns to improve labor conditions in the industry. Many economists point out 
that low-wage, labor-intensive production of items like apparel is often a taking off point for 
development in poor agrarian countries with abundant labor and little capital. But low wages 
alone do not a sweatshop make. Though much debate focuses on wages, there are other 
practices, such as forced labor or safety conditions or denial of legally-mandated benefits that 
campaigns also address. 
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 Many of the issues are the same, but a major difference between anti-sweatshop 
campaigns at the turn of the 21st century and those at the turn of the 20th century is that 
sweatshops then were largely local whereas today they are found mostly in poor developing 
countries.13  This means that US-based activists cannot lobby the US government to directly 
improve labor standards. Instead, they must target US-based corporations who operate or source 
in developing countries or pressure the world trading community to demand changes in less 
developed countries. This strategy, as well as many of today’s human rights vigilantes, have 
roots in the anti-apartheid campaign (see box 1). Anti-apartheid activists first pressured firms 
through the Sullivan Principles and then, when progress lagged, turned to pressing governments 
to impose economic sanctions on the apartheid regime. It is perhaps no coincidence that anti-
sweatshop campaigns gathered steam in the 1990s after apartheid was formally buried. 
 Exhibit 7 summarizes the 1990s anti-sweatshop campaigns. They begin in 1992, when 
Levi Strauss adopted the first known code of conduct addressing sweatshop abuses in response 
to a Department of Labor investigation into illegal wage and other practices at supplier factories 
in the US territory of Saipan (Varley 1998, 12). This code included criteria for source country 
selection, as well as terms of engagement for suppliers. A year later, Levi’s announced that it 
would withdraw from China because the human rights situation was unacceptable; but Levi’s 
never completed the withdrawal and, in April 1998, reversed course and announced it was 
expanding operations in China.  
 Shortly after Levi’s announced its code, a television broadcast showing children in a 
Bangladesh factory sewing Wal-Mart label garments led that retailer to develop “Standards for 
Vendor Partners.” But Wal-Mart also soon found itself back in the spotlight. In Spring 1996, the 
NLC’s Kernaghan revealed that clothing endorsed by television personality Kathie Lee Gifford 
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and sold at Wal-Mart was made under exploitative conditions in Honduras. Kernaghan had a 
powerful symbol for this campaign in 15-year old Wendy Diaz, a Honduran orphan who had 
worked long hours at low wages at the plant since she was 13 to support herself and three 
younger brothers. Her story struck a particular chord because the Kathie Lee labels advertised 
her commitment to children and pledged a share of the profits to children’s causes. Gifford 
initially denied the allegations, then condemned the sweatshop practices and pledged to ensure 
that her clothing line was never again made under such conditions. After other Gifford-endorsed 
clothing was discovered being manufactured in a New York City sweatshop that ignored labor 
laws, Secretary of Labor Robert Reich enlisted her into his “No Sweat” campaign to combat 
sweatshops in the United States. 
 Around the same time, activists pressured The Gap to allow independent monitoring by a 
local NGO of a contract facility in El Salvador. Under similar pressure in 1997, Phillips-Van 
Heusen (PVH), whose CEO sits on the board of Human Rights Watch, recognized a union at a 
joint venture facility in Guatemala, a first in that country's apparel export sector (Varley 1998, 
141-49). With the sweatshop issue in the headlines, President Clinton joined with Reich, Gifford 
and others in August 1996 to create the Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) to combat sweatshop 
practices internationally. Although many multinational corporations and US retailers sourcing 
abroad had responded to activist pressure and bad publicity by adopting corporate codes of 
conduct, the codes varied widely in the issues they addressed and did not seriously address 
issues of compliance. The AIP brought together apparel manufacturers and retailer/importers, 
unions, and NGOs in an effort to develop an industry-wide code and a credible monitoring 
mechanism to verify compliance. 
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 When the AIP released its draft code and principles for monitoring in April 1997, anti-
sweatshop activists had divergent views on its value. Global Exchange’s Medea Benjamin 
blasted it as a “lousy agreement,” primarily because it did not include a living wage. UNITE 
President Jay Mazur, an AIP member, called the code “unprecedented” and “a step in the right 
direction” (NewsHour transcript, April 14, 1997). Continuing negotiations on implementation 
quickly bogged down, however. In November 1998, the AIP unveiled plans to create a Fair 
Labor Association to oversee implementation and monitoring of the code. UNITE, and the other 
union member, the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, and the Interfaith Center for 
Corporate Responsibility rejected the FLA as too weak and left the organization. These groups 
complained that the code failed to require payment of a living wage; had weak language with 
respect to union rights in nondemocratic countries; and had an inadequate monitoring and 
verification mechanism. 
 Nearly two years later, the FLA still had no union representatives, though Lenore Miller 
of the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union was serving on the newly-formed NGO 
Advisory Council in her personal capacity. As of June 2001, nine companies had been accepted 
for FLA participation, including Nike, Reebok, Philips-Van Heusen, Levi’s, Liz Claiborne, 
Eddie Bauer, GEAR for Sports, Patagonia, and adidas-Salomon, and the FLA had certified 6 
auditors, including NGOs in Guatemala and Bangladesh, operating in 16 of the top 20 countries 
supplying apparel and footwear to the US market (www.fairlabor.org, last visited June 27, 2001). 
By mid-2001, more than 150 universities had also affiliated with the FLA and their pressure on 
licensees to certify compliance with minimum labor standards led to nearly 1,000 suppliers of 
college-logo apparel applying for participation in FLA monitoring.  Five years after the AIP was 
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launched, the FLA expects to finally begin external monitoring of participating companies this 
year. 
 The student activists in University Students Against Sweatshops (USAS), however, view 
the FLA as ineffective and condemned their universities for joining.  In mid-2000, they created 
the Worker Rights Consortium (WRC), with a stronger code and alternative “verification model” 
(exhibit 8). USAS pressured universities to join the WRC instead of the FLA, and, by June 2001, 
more than 80 universities had signed on, though some, such as Brown University and the 
University of Michigan, affiliated with the FLA as well.  In early 2001, the WRC conducted its 
first investigation of alleged code violations at a Mexican factory supplying Nike and Reebok. 
While finding that further actions were needed, it praised the companies and factory 
management for taking “significant constructive steps” to remediate the problems found in the 
investigation (http://www.workersrights.org/Kukdong_2.doc.htm). 
 In a separate effort, the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP), which has for many years 
provided information on the social and environmental policies of companies, developed SA 8000 
in consultation with corporations, unions, and NGOs, including representatives from developing 
countries. The CEP also established an agency, recently renamed Social Accountability 
International (previously known as CEPAA) to accredit auditors of the SA 8000 standard. As of 
mid-2001, SAI had accredited 7 auditors who had in turn certified more than 60 manufacturers 
or business service organizations, just under half in China, as in compliance with SA 8000. At 
least one of the plants in China was decertified, however, after an NLC report alleging a variety 
of violations was confirmed by SAI auditors (Business Week, October 2, 2000). The organization 
also has 9 retailer “members,” including Avon, Toys R Us, and Dole Foods; who are expected to 
encourage their suppliers to seek certification.  
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 Another organization, Verite, established in 1995, provides firms with independent 
monitoring of working conditions through human rights inspections of factories worldwide, 
particularly in China and Asia. Though hired by firms, Verite retains the right to publish the 
results of its inspections if the firm does not rectify problems in six months (Rothstein 1996). 
Verite is also an accredited auditor under the FLA. The Ethical Trade Initiative is a European 
effort that combines elements of the FLA and CEPAA, though it does not plan to create its own 
monitoring mechanism. Rugmark is another European initiative that a US group has replicated 
here, to label hand-made carpets as child-labor free.14 
 Arguments over codes of conduct among activists and between them and firms have 
highlighted three key issues in using workplace codes to improve labor conditions: what goes 
into the code, the disclosure of plants covered by the code, and who monitors the code (exhibit 
8). The most divisive issue regarding the content of codes is whether to include a living wage:  
SA 8000 and the WRC do, the FLA does not. The idea of a living wage resonates with many 
people, but it is difficult to define and many corporations oppose it, which could deter broad 
acceptance of codes that include this provision. The WRC has said that, while a living wage is 
crucial to their code, universities are not required to implement that provision pending research 
on how to measure it. A second area of disagreement has been over how to ensure freedom of 
association in countries such as China where the state restricts this right. 
 Regardless of content, codes can gain broad public support only if they have a credible 
monitoring mechanism. For outside NGOs or any other independent organization to monitor 
adherence to codes, there must be transparency in the names and locations of subcontractors. 
Initially major manufacturers refused to identify their subcontractors, claiming it was a trade 
secret. The failure of the FLA to require such disclosure contributed to the decision by USAS to 
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develop the Worker Rights Consortium as an alternative. The students’ persistence on the 
disclosure issue was rewarded in fall 1999 when several firms agreed to make this information 
public, including Nike, which released a list of 41 plants producing licensed apparel for Duke, 
North Carolina, Georgetown, Michigan, and Arizona (www.nikebiz.com/labor/disclosure.shtml; 
last visited January 1, 2001). 
  Equally divisive is the issue of who does the monitoring. Firms prefer monitors from the 
business community, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and Ernst andYoung, whom they 
pay and with whom they often do other business. Activists prefer monitors from local NGOs 
because they believe workers will feel more comfortable talking to them and, therefore, are more 
likely to be honest in discussing problems at the plant. They are suspicious of business monitors 
and are fearful of Potemkin Village audits of the kind that Andrew Young performed for NIKE 
in 1997 with a whirlwind tour of factories that concluded all was well. Such skepticism appeared 
justified when the Transnational Resource and Action Center posted on its Corporate Watch 
website (www.corpwatch.org) a leaked Ernst and Young audit that concluded that Nike violated 
a number of Vietnamese labor laws. A recent report by O’Rourke (2000) identified a number of 
problems with company-arranged audits by PwC, especially in the areas of freedom of 
association and health and safety. O’Rourke concluded that PwC’s methodology was flawed, 
biased toward management, and that the auditors themselves were inadequately trained. 
 The FLA and CEPAA address these problems by requiring that companies use an auditor 
that has been certified by them as qualified to do independent verification of compliance. Both 
organizations require monitors to consult with local NGOs and encourage NGOs to apply for 
accreditation but critics argue that the accreditation procedures are too expensive or too complex 
for most NGOs to master. In an interesting variation, the FLA allows agents to be accredited to 
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monitor particular parts of the code, without being expert in all of them. Although the FLA does 
not explicitly encourage member companies to use teams of monitors, with expertise in different 
areas, this provision at least envisions such a possibility.  
 But USAS objects to the fact that the traditional accounting firms can be certified under 
these programs and  believes that the FLA approach leaves too much control in the hands of the 
corporations (see exhibit 8).15 Realizing that even the best monitoring system cannot certify with 
100 percent certainty that even one factory is in compliance with a code 365 days a year, the 
WRC rejects the typical monitoring and certification model because it conveys a “good 
housekeeping seal of approval,” even when problems remain in some areas. Their verification 
model enforces compliance through complete disclosure of plant locations and information on 
conditions in them, backed by a system of local NGOs prepared to receive worker complaints. 
 Indicative of the depth of these conflicts, in spring 2000 NIKE ended licensing 
agreements with Brown and the University of Michigan and cut off personal and corporate 
contributions to CEO Phil Knight’s alma mater, the University of Oregon, after these universities 
joined the WRC. Nike objected to the unwillingness of USAS to include corporations in the 
negotiation of WRC principles and procedures and also criticized the “ambiguous living wage” 
provision and “gotcha monitoring” (www.nikebiz.com/media/n_uofo.shtml; last visited 
September 1, 2000). 
Assessing the effectiveness of the campaigns 
 In their analysis of transnational advocacy, Keck and Sikkink (1998, 25) identify five 
levels of potential effectiveness: 
• “issue creation and agenda-setting;” 
• “influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations” 
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• “influence on institutional procedures” 
• “influence on policy change in ‘target actors’” (states, international organizations, 
corporations or other private sector actors) 
• “influence on state [or corporate] behavior.” 
 Examining selected anti-sweatshop campaigns from this perspective shows that activists 
have succeeded in getting the sweatshop issue on the agenda of corporations, governments and 
international organizations; and have influenced the discursive position of states and 
international organizations, and firms as well. Most major visible retail marketers have adopted 
corporate codes of conducts addressing various labor standards.16 
 But the effects on behavior are weaker. Exhibit 9 provides a summary of various 
campaigns together with a crude measure of their achievements, using a 1 (little or no effect) to 5 
(very effective) scale. We have given low scores even to relatively successful campaigns in part 
because some targeted firms backed off from their early responses or were subsequently found to 
have done less than they promised. For instance, Kernaghans’s revelations about Kathie Lee 
apparel raised questions about Wal-Mart’s earlier commitment to enforcing its code of conduct. 
Subsequent allegations about Wal-Mart contractors in China, Saipan, and elsewhere suggest 
changes in behavior remain elusive. Phillips-Van Heusen canceled its contract with the 
unionized plant in Guatemala, forcing its closure. PVH claimed it did so because it lost a major 
contract and had excess capacity, but critics questioned the significance of the business lost and 
wondered why PVH could not have reduced capacity at a nonunionized plant. Independent 
monitoring at The Gap facility in El Salvador continues and Liz Claiborne, a member of the 
FLA, also signed an agreement for independent monitoring of a supplier there. Levi Strauss 
expanded its operations in China despite a worsening human rights environment and initially 
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resisted joining the FLA or allowing any external monitoring at its facilities. In 1998, however, 
Levi’s approached Oxfam about establishing a pilot monitoring program in its Dominican 
Republic operations and subsequently joined both the FLA and the Ethical Trade Initiative in 
Europe (Oxfam 1998-99).  
 In contrast to these partial or sometimes temporary successes is the failed NLC campaign 
against Disney and its licensees in Haiti. With its focus on children and family values, Disney 
looked like a good follow-on to the Kathie Lee campaign. Instead, Disney was perhaps the 
NLC’s biggest failure. Although Disney sent its own investigators to check out the facilities in 
Haiti and reportedly pressured them to make some improvements (see www.cleanclothes.org), 
one Disney  subcontractor in Haiti withdrew, causing the shutdown of the plant. Disney 
alternated between flatly denying the allegations or simply not responding. Although Kernaghan 
staged protests outside a Disney store in New York, consumers did not respond and the pressure 
did not force any substantial change in Disney’s operations (Los Angeles Times, July 25, 1996). 
One possible reason this campaign failed is that children are the ultimate consumer and many 
parents cannot say no when their child desperately wants the latest Disney product that all their 
friends have. Another possible explanation is that it was difficult to embarrass Disney CEO 
Michael Eisner as a hypocrite because he lacks visible links to human rights and charitable 
causes that other targets have had.17 
 The narrow membership of the FLA and SAI; difficulties in getting the FLA monitoring 
system up and going; the split between the FLA and Worker Rights Consortium, and the 
development of SA 8000 in competition with both highlight two weaknesses of the anti-
sweatshop campaigns. The limited membership of the umbrella groups, combined with Nike’s 
reaction to the WRC and Disney’s stonewalling of Kernaghan, suggest that most firms still view 
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the activists as a minor rather than serious threat. The proliferating number of groups risk 
consumer confusion and frustration, which could further exacerbate the problem of generating 
enough demand to force changes in corporate behavior (Freeman, 1998; Liubicic 1998).18  
 Could these divisions be reduced and the various participants in the anti-sweatshop 
activity advance under a common banner? The example of environmental groups interested in 
promoting sustainable forestry suggests that under some circumstances different activists and 
firms can coalesce around a common standard overseen by a single accreditation agency. In 1993 
environmental groups, forest companies and retailers, negotiated a code and developed the 
Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) for certifying compliance (see box 2). Some 
environmentalists have criticized the FSC for cooperating too closely with industry groups, but 
large American timber companies formed the rival Sustainable Forestry Initiative because they 
regard FSC standards as too stringent. Nevertheless, the FSC has succeeded in getting 
commitments from major retailers selling more than 20 percent of the lumber products used in 
home repair and remodeling in the United States and an even higher share in Europe. “Industry 
executives say the movement is quickly reaching critical mass, and could soon make it a liability 
for wood products producers not to have the FSC imprimatur” (Wall Street Journal, September 
26, 2000, 1). 
 However, there are important differences between consumer desire for clothing made 
outside of sweatshops and the desire for sustainable forestry. Self-interest among firms operated 
as an important motivator in sustaining the FSC campaign, in ways that it has not in the anti-
sweatshop area . Several wood products retailers identified a competitive advantage in being 
“green” and thus were willing to make commitments to buy FSC-certified products.19 Individual 
consumers also often see gains to themselves from environmental improvements, whereas the 
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beneficiaries from improvements in sweatshops are the workers in those factories. The 
sustainable forestry campaign also suggests that vigilante pressure works better when there are a 
relatively small fixed number of market leaders whose actions can be readily monitored. 
Sweatshop activists have focused on major firms, but the wide supply chain in apparel makes it 
hard to pin down key decision-makers. Moreover, in both forestry and apparel, a successful 
campaign can disadvantage small suppliers. In the forestry case, this presumably creates no new 
environmental problem, but in the sweatshop case, success may displace home-workers or others 
in the informal sector who cannot enter the formal economy for cultural, child-rearing or other 
reasons.20 
 The anti-sweatshop activists also have a more difficult task than anti-apartheid activists 
in an earlier era. In contrast to ending apartheid, success in eradicating sweatshop exploitation is 
more difficult to measure:  exactly what defines a sweatshop and what does it mean to clean 
them up? Success is measured in incremental steps and requires constant vigilance to guard 
against backsliding. The anti-apartheid activists had strong union and non-governmental groups 
in less developed countries with which to work, and the ANC to press for changes on the ground. 
Indeed, in contrast to the anti-sweatshop activists, who are leading the worldwide campaign 
against sweatshops, anti-apartheid activists played a more secondary role, supporting the ANC in 
its efforts to overturn the minority apartheid regime in South Africa.  
 
5  Risks and Limitations of the Activist Consumer-based Model 
 “Bad jobs at bad wages are better than no jobs at all.”  Paul Krugman 21 
 “Empleo si, pero con dignidad.” Nicaraguan Maria Elena Cuadra, Movement of Working 
and Unemployed Women.22 
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 Most developing country governments, multinational corporations, and trade economists, 
and many development experts argue that anti-sweatshop campaigns are likely to do more harm 
than good.23  How valid are their concerns? How much good can even the most successful 
activist-initiated, consumer-based campaign do in improving labor standards in poor countries? 
 
The risk that doing good will do harm 
 The argument that anti-sweatshop campaigns risk harm to workers in less developed 
countries begins with the fact that sweatshop jobs are better than jobs in rural agriculture or the 
informal sector, particularly for the young women who make up the bulk of the sweatshop work 
force. Studies of wages and employment show that foreign-owned and export-oriented factories 
in developing countries typically offer higher pay and better conditions than those of domestic 
firms producing for the local market (Varley 1998). Wages in footwear and apparel may be at the 
bottom of manufacturing, but they are generally higher than the minimum wage level in many 
developing countries and better than conditions in agriculture (US Department of Labor 2000). 
While there are situations where workers are misled by employer promises, subject to forced 
labor, or paid less than they are promised, workers choose sweatshop jobs because those jobs are 
the best alternatives available to them. 
 Critics of human rights vigilantes fear that the campaigns will discourage exports from 
less developed countries and reduce foreign investment in those countries, which would lower 
the demand for labor and reduce worker well-being. Some believe that the activists are 
motivated by protectionism or are misguided followers of those who are. The evidence in earlier 
sections rejects this assertion. The human rights groups, students, and church groups who make 
up the activist community do not compete with low paid workers in developing countries. If they 
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succeed in their campaigns, they will raise the prices of the goods they consume rather than raise 
trade barriers. USAS, which has close ties to the apparel union UNITE, has opposed firms 
shifting production of college logo clothing to US factories as a means of improving standards 
(Moore 2000, 10). The NLC’s Kernaghan has also criticized firms that “cut and run” rather than 
clean up and monitor a substandard facility. 
 But motivation aside, anti-sweat campaigns could still have adverse effects on 
developing country workers. Even if anti-sweatshop campaigns do not call for consumer 
boycotts of targeted goods, negative publicity could deter trade and investment and reduce the 
number of jobs available in countries with already high levels of unemployment and 
underemployment. Or campaigns could have the perverse effect of pushing production out of the 
formal sector into areas of the economy with even lower standards and less visibility. Demands 
for living wages in anti-sweatshop campaigns run the greatest risk of backfiring, since such 
demands could price workers in less developed countries out of some markets. This is 
particularly the case if the living wage target is determined by outside activists with strong 
ideological stances rather than by local NGOs or unions who can better weigh the danger to jobs 
of large imposed increases in wages. In terms of our analysis, an “excessive living wage” would 
place the cost curve for making improvements far above the price line, so that firms would fight 
this demand, or close shop. 
 To date, however, the danger that anti-sweat shop campaigns will harm workers in less 
developed countries has been more rhetoric than reality. One reason is that the activists are 
aware of the dangers and try to avoid them. Indeed, the wide range of groups in the activist 
community almost guarantees that if some group pushes demands that are counter-productive 
another group will modify them or take corrective action.  
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 Campaigns against child labor provide an example of this. The ILO’s International 
Program on the Elimination of Child Labor works to replace child labor with better 
opportunities. In two cases, involving the Bangladesh garment industry and Pakistani-produced 
soccer balls, external pressure led to joint initiatives involving industry, government, and the 
ILO that required the provision of educational alternatives for displaced child workers and 
turned a potential harm into a positive outcome. In Bangladesh, more than 12,000 children were 
moved from work to school and their share of the workforce in the garment sector has fallen 
from an estimated 30 percent to just 5 percent five years later (ILO 2000, 55). In Pakistan, 
thousands more children also have better opportunities as a result of outside intervention and 
assistance. Similarly, consumers buying Rugmark-labeled, child-free carpets pay a premium that, 
in addition to paying the costs of certification, goes to build schools for affected children. In the 
absence of ready alternatives, NLC campaigns that target child labor concentrate on increasing 
the pay for children, rather than on getting firms to produce goods child-free. 
 Activist debates over living wages also give considerable attention to the dangers of 
unintended adverse consequences. A 1999 anti-sweatshop symposium at the University of 
Wisconsin warned that campaigns “may produce serious negative feedback loops. These could 
include the following: Firms may concentrate their production of college apparel in high-wage 
countries, moving more of their other operations to the lower-wage economies. ... Firms could 
maintain production in the low-wage economies, but create small high-wage enclaves within 
them (which would have) little positive effect on the rest of the local labor market. Setting the 
wage too high relative to local market conditions could create difficulties for monitoring. This is 
because a strong incentive would be created to circumvent the wage mandate. For example, 
workers could sell a share of their high-wage jobs under the table to their relatives or friends; so 
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that, in fact, multiple workers are employed at a single ‘living wage’ job.”  The conclusion was 
that any campaign had to take account of  local market conditions and base its decision on “What 
would be the wage bargained for by workers if they were allowed to organize and bargain 
collectively in a free, democratic environment?”24 
 Fears that anti-sweatshop campaigns could reduce foreign investment and jobs in less 
advanced countries seem in any case beside the point in a world where the overwhelming trend 
is toward expansion of manufacturing, particularly apparel and shoes, into less developed 
countries. The income gaps between those countries and advanced countries are so great that it is 
difficult to imagine a scenario where anti-sweatshop activism could reverse this trend, even if, 
contrary to the evidence, the activists wanted to accomplish as much. The danger is much more 
that firms will shift their operations from less developed countries with higher and more 
expensive standards to similar countries with lower and less expensive labor standards. As an 
example, in the banana industry, lower-cost labor in Ecuador --in part the result of low 
unionization rates -- threatens workers in Colombia. But such threats are likely with or without 
activist campaigns.  
Limits of the market for standards 
 Assume that human rights vigilantes ran a completely successful anti-sweatshop 
campaign, inducing all their targets to have verifiable codes of conduct and avoiding adverse 
unintended consequences. By itself, how much would this raise living standards in the targeted 
countries? Sadly, not by much. Consumers appear to care largely about the ways in which the 
things they personally consume are produced, so that virtually all campaigns focus on standards 
in export sectors in less developed countries, rather than in sectors with the worst labor 
conditions or on conditions in less developed countries more broadly.25 In total, exports by low 
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income countries of apparel and footwear are only 2 percent of world exports, 14 percent of total 
low-income country exports, and 3 percent of their GDP. 
 Moreover, since the major stick behind the campaigns is the threat to corporate 
reputations or brand names, activist campaigns target well-known firms, rather than producers of 
generic and unbranded products, who may produce goods under poorer conditions than better-
known firms. The high-end retailer/marketer who uses a relatively smaller number of more 
stable suppliers is also more likely to be able to enforce compliance with standards. Lower-end 
retailers, such as Wal-Mart, who are more interested in price than quality or design, often use 
middle-man buyers to locate suppliers, making it hard to enforce their codes of conduct. The 
college apparel market targeted by USAS is smaller yet. 
 In short, human rights vigilantes cannot greatly improve living standards in poor 
countries under any realistic scenario -- only sustained economic growth can do that -- though 
they may be able to bring some modest gain in well-being to some workers. 
What about the workers? 
 “In the end the only ones who can stand up for workers’ rights are workers themselves” 
Medea Benjamin26   
 Anti-sweatshop campaigns in advanced countries would be unnecessary if workers in 
less developed countries were free to defend their own well-being by forming trade unions or 
other such organizations. At best activists in advanced countries interceding for workers is a 
second best alternative to workers defending their own rights, negotiating with management 
appropriate standards, and jointly monitoring implementation. In industries with high labor 
turnover, external monitors cannot readily inform workers about codes of conduct, nor provide 
the day-to-day scrutiny of facilities that workers can (Frost 2000; Bernard 1997). 
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 More broadly, Keck and Sikkink (1998) find that having allies within the targeted 
country is a factor in many of the successful cases of transnational advocacy that they studied. 
Vocal support for economic sanctions by black leaders in South Africa, even though they were 
the ones expected to suffer the most economic pain, was an important factor in the success of the 
anti-apartheid campaign.  
 In contrast, anti-sweatshop campaigns have made little or no headway in pressing for 
freedom of association in less advanced countries, which would give exploited workers a voice. 
The WRC, the FLA and SA 8000 codes include respect for freedom of association and collective 
bargaining rights, but implementation of these codes is difficult absent major changes in the 
developing countries themselves. Even corporations concerned with standards typically leave 
union rights out of their codes of conduct (ILO 1998; Varley 1998) Business is typically anti-
union because unions will alter authority relations within firms and shift revenues from owners 
to workers (ILO 2000, 61-63). The government of  many less developed countries, including 
China, oppose freedom of association, because unions are an independent source of power on a 
political scene otherwise dominated by a single party or narrow elite. These attitudes make 
unionization extraordinarily difficult to attain, even in countries that nominally accept the 
freedom of association standard of the ILO. At the same time, activists are likely to have trouble 
arousing consumer concern over the freedom to unionize, according to the PIPA poll in exhibit 
1. 
 Campaigns where unionism was a key issue, as with the PVH plant in Guatemala, have 
not been sustained for long. By shifting orders to a nonunion firm, multinationals can readily 
undo the effects of successful organization, or they can accede to other demands but not to 
demands for organization. At the Gap’s Mandarin factory in El Salvador, the main source of 
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contention was the unwillingness of management to allow formation of a union and the firing of 
union organizers. After the campaign publicized violations in the company’s code of conduct, 
the Gap worked to improve conditions and even guaranteed a minimum number of orders, 
offsetting lost orders from elsewhere that resulted from negative publicity (Varley 1998, 302). In 
addition, the Gap allowed independent monitoring, but there is still no union in that plant. 
 In fact, although some human rights vigilante groups, like the NLC and USAS, have 
close ties to trade unions, there are serious tensions between the vigilante groups and unions 
(Compa, 2000). The anti-sweat NGOs are not elected by workers. They are accountable to 
consumers, funders, and other Western supporters. Some trade unionists fear that the vigilantes 
demands for corporate codes of conduct and independent monitoring will inadvertently serve as 
a weak substitute for unions. On the other side, the NGOs feel that they can accomplish 
something, while it is unrealistic to expect free and independent unions to operate in many third 
world countries. 
 In a September 1998 workshop organized by the British-based NGO Labour Rights 
Network (the NGO representatives to the Ethical Trade Initiative), representatives from 
developing countries stressed the importance of involving local NGOs and unions from the 
beginning in anti-sweatshop campaigns to ensure that they address local priorities and interests. 
They agreed that while “Codes could be useful as a means of exerting leverage on management, 
the key issue was workers’ own level of organisation and ability to carry out collective 
bargaining. ... The ideal combination is for NGOs to play a supporting role by providing training 
and services and campaigning for the respect of trade union rights, and encouraging more 
traditional unions to take up previously unrepresented groups and gender issues.” 27  
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 Of the other human rights vigilante groups, USAS has been particularly attuned to the 
need to gain support from workers groups on the ground. The Workers Rights Consortium 
eschews the usual monitoring agencies and emphasizes the need to engage and strengthen local 
workers’ organizations and NGOs by providing financial and technical assistance.  
 
6. Conclusion: When Does Doing Good Do Good? 
 “Not to sound Pollyannish, but I believe there is a basic decency in the American people 
that these companies don’t understand. We have to try to tap this decency. When we do that, we 
get a tremendous response.”  Charles Kernaghan (The New York Times, June 18, 1996) 
 The goal of anti-sweatshop campaigns is to improve conditions for workers in less 
developed countries. But they cannot do this directly. Their effectiveness depends on catalyzing 
other economic agents:  firms, governments, international agencies, and the sweatshop workers 
themselves. To what extent and under what conditions have campaigns succeeded? 
 A priori, there are a range of possible outcomes from anti-sweatshop campaigns:  (1) the 
campaigns could make things worse by generating negative publicity that causes sales or prices 
to drop for the products of sweatshop workers; (2) the campaigns could have no effect at all if 
firms do not view the threat of a consumer backlash as credible; (3) the campaigns could 
catalyze firms to improve standards when the consumer threat is credible relative to the cost of 
improvements; or (4) the campaigns could catalyze firms, governments, and international 
agencies to undertake broader sustainable improvements. 
 Our analysis rejects (1) and indicates that the activitists have had at least limited success 
in catalyzing consumers and firms to change their behavior to improve sweatshop conditions. 
Activist campaigns have succeeded in getting most major, visible retailers and marketers to 
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develop their own corporate codes of conduct addressing various labor standards. They have 
induced some, such as the GAP and NIKE, to improve labor conditions in their overseas 
factories, at some expense. The April 2000 Starbucks agreement to market Fair Trade certified 
coffee, which gives farmers a premium over the prevailing market price, would never have been 
done had not human rights vigilantes developed a social climate where such actions are seen as 
in the corporate interest. Similarly, the fact that Nike and Reebok eliminated toxic chemicals in 
the production of athletic footwear is, at least in part, a response to activist pressures. And while 
many activists attack the FLA because it is much weaker than they would like, its creation, and 
that of SA8000, are also a product of their campaigns. Some campaigns have indeed shifted the 
price curve facing firms so that the firms have chosen the “improved standards” solution (see 
exhibit 4). So far, however, the successes are ad hoc and often temporary.  
 The limited direct effects of campaigns are not the end of the story, however. The anti-
sweatshop activists have had gotten sweatshop issues on the international agenda and, together 
with unions and other groups protesting the policies of the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
have convinced key governments and international agencies that they must deal with labor 
standards to maintain support for liberal trade policies. This pressure has contributed to a variety 
of efforts by agents with more reach and power than the activists to empower workers and better 
enforce labor standards. 
 On the government side, the insistence of the Clinton administration that new multilateral 
trade negotiations address labor standards issues is a response to activist and US union pressures. 
Without these pressures, new “fast-track” trade negotiating authority likely would have been 
approved by Congress without attention to this issue (Elliott 2000). Congress also would not 
have raised the US contribution to the ILO campaign to eliminate child labor from $2.1 million 
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in 1995 to $45 million in 2001 (Congressional Record, December 15, 2000, H12128). While the 
US cannot dictate the place of labor standards in the next round of world trade negotiations -- 
China and other less advanced countries are adamantly opposed-- the fact that the debate is not 
whether but how to strengthen enforcement of core labor standards (as defined by the ILO, 
World Social Summit, and others) is an important outcome from a decade of activism. 
 On the international agency front, activists have put labor rights on the world agenda in a 
big way. In 1999, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan unveiled a new “Global Compact,” calling 
on the business community to respect nine core principles in the areas of human rights, worker 
rights, and environmental protection. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development recently added language on worker rights to its guidelines for multinational 
corporations and The World Bank has a child labor program and is focusing more attention on 
gender discrimination issues. Maybe with a bit more pressure, the International Monetary Fund 
will endorse transparency in labor markets, as it does in capital markets and the World Bank will 
drop its ambivalence about the role of unions in development. 
 The major beneficiary of activist pressures to strengthen enforcement of standards is the 
International Labor Organization. As a result of the desire of employers and key governments to 
divert pressures to incorporate labor standards in the WTO and other trade agreements, the ILO 
is receiving both more attention and more resources to deal with “core” labor standards, 
especially child labor. Yes, the 2000-2001 $56 million budget for the ILO’s Program to 
Eliminate Child Poverty is minuscule in comparison with the revenues and expenditures of 
almost any multinational firm. The ILO also does not have anything like the financial resources 
to push its child labor program that the IMF or World Bank have to push their programs of 
financial reforms or economic rectitude. But this is a huge increase over previous budgets, with 
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much of the increase funded by the United States. In addition, the ILO codified the consensus 
definition of “core” labor standards in its 1998 “Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work” and is also receiving increased funding from the US and other governments to 
beef up the monitoring of and technical assistance for the enforcement of core standards. 
 The best example of how activism has galvanized the ILO and produced a better outcome 
for workers than activists could have attained by themselves is in the child labor area. In the mid-
1990s, activists exposed the use of child labor in the Bangladeshi garment industry and in the 
soccer ball industry in Pakistan and pressured producers and retailers to address the problem. 
The initial industry response in Bangladesh was to throw the children out on the street and it was 
only after the ILO and UNICEF intervened that a constructive solution was found. 
Manufacturers in Bangladesh and Pakistan agreed not simply to stop employing children but to 
cooperate with and assist in the funding of programs to put them in schools or other 
rehabilitative training, and to allow the ILO to monitor the results.  
 Finally, the upsurge of labor activism in some poor Asian countries, notably Cambodia 
and Indonesia, shows how external pressure and support, in these cases from activists, 
governments, and the ILO, can empower workers (Time, July 10, 2000, “Hell No, We Won’t 
Sew”). In a bilateral trade negotiation with Cambodia, the United States responded to activist 
and union pressure to promote labor standards by using its market power as a carrot, rather than 
a stick. As part of a bilateral textile trade agreement, US negotiators offered to expand 
Cambodia’s export quota by 14 percent if “working conditions in the Cambodia textile and 
apparel sector substantially comply with [local] labor law and standards.”28  In the first review in 
December 1999, US officials concluded that “substantial compliance” had not been achieved 
but, in recognition of the progress that had been made, it offered a 5 percent quota increase to be 
 45
implemented when Cambodia completed an agreement with the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) creating an independent monitoring program (USTR press release, 18 May 
2000). The ILO agreed to the plan after gaining a commitment from US officials to fund a 
parallel program to provide technical assistance and training to the Cambodian labor ministry 
and the quota increase was granted in May 2000. In response to worker protests following 
conclusion of the bilateral agreement, the secretary-general of the Cambodia Garment 
Manufacturers Association complained, “All the attention gives the workers the comfort level 
that they are calling the shots” (Financial Times, April 7, 2000). In this case, activist pressure 
contributed to empowerment of the 15 to 20 percent of Cambodian workers in the apparel sector, 
at least some increased access to the US market, and increased bureaucratic capacity to enforce 
labor standards for all workers. 
 Despite signs of movement, activists have been least successful is in moving the core 
labor standard of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining from rhetoric to 
reality. These “enabling rights” would allow sweatshop workers to decide for themselves what 
issues to pursue, trade-offs to make, and battles to conduct with their employers and would 
probably do more for improving labor standards than anything else. The activists are a key voice 
directing attention to violations of the rights of workers who seek to exercise their rights 
overseas, but they ultimately must rely on workers and institutions in those countries to take the 
lead, much as the African National Congress and COSATU did in South Africa.29 
 Still, these cases show that activist pressure can catalyze more powerful actors on the 
world scene and contribute to improvements in whole sectors, rather than single plants. Such 
agreements are likely to be more sustainable than standard anti-sweatshop campaigns because 
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the ILO and Western governments provide financial and technical assistance and because the 
ILO monitors implementation.  
 Finally, while anti-sweatshop campaigns do risk reducing the flow of resources to less 
developed countries, they can also increase those flows. At the consumer level, this can occur 
when consumers pay for improvements in labor standards through higher prices or when the 
campaigns squeeze oligopolistic profits on branded goods. In some sectors, such as soccer balls 
which are overwhelmingly sourced in Pakistan, or in cases where campaigns cover the bulk of 
firms in a sector, they have the potential to improve the terms of trade for the less developed 
country (Brown, Deardorff, and Stern 1993). At the national or international level this can occur 
through an increase in expenditures in technical assistance or funding of programs, for instance 
to move children from work to school. But to have a bigger effect, the anti-sweat activists would 
have to tackle issues that go beyond poor labor conditions in particular factories or in particular 
products – such as debt relief and reduction of  trade barriers to developing countries -- that they 
have thus far not put at the front of their agenda. 
 In sum, by putting labor rights and the living standards of workers in poor countries on 
the agenda of powerful economic agents and governments and international agencies, human 
rights vigilantes have catalyzed something that has the potential for improving the well-being of 
workers in poorer countries. There is nothing in economic analysis, however, that guarantees a 
positive result nor that guarantees the bad outcomes that critics of the activists fear. It depends 
on the smarts of the activists and their campaigns. 
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Box 1 Precedents in the Anti-Apartheid Campaign 
 An early attempt to use grass-roots pressure to influence corporate policies in foreign 
countries was the anti-apartheid campaign of the 1970s and 1980s.30 Seeking to pressure the 
minority white government to reform, anti-apartheid activists first tried to convince foreign 
investors to withdraw from South Africa. When that failed, the Reverend Leon Sullivan 
developed a code of conduct to encourage corporations in South Africa to treat black workers 
equally and to set an example by promoting them to management positions. To induce 
companies to either withdraw from South Africa or accept the Sullivan Principles, activists used 
threats of boycotts, shareholder pressure by church organizations, and protests by college 
students calling on their universities to cleanse their endowments of investments in companies 
operating in South Africa. The Sullivan Principles were adopted by hundreds of companies and 
improved conditions for black workers in some facilities. But the ultimate goal remained the end 
of apartheid and the Principles had little impact on the white regime’s commitment to or ability 
to sustain it. 
 As unrest and violence escalated in the mid-1980s, increasing numbers of foreign 
investors withdrew from South Africa, but this was largely due to the deteriorating economic and 
political situation in South Africa rather than to pressure from anti-apartheid activists. In 
particular, the decision by Chase Manhattan not to rollover loans to South Africa in mid-1985, 
following the government’s declaration of a state of emergency, appears to have been driven by 
an assessment of the risks involved in investing in South Africa, not activist pressures in the 
United States. That decision in turn triggered a financial crisis in South Africa. 
 Frustrated by the intransigence of the white regime, American activists turned their 
attention to the US Congress. Civil disobedience by protestors over the course of many months 
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in front of the South African embassy in Washington raised the profile of the issue and 
contributed to passage of legislation imposing economic sanctions against South Africa in 1986. 
In 1987, Sullivan gave up on his code and called for additional sanctions, including mandatory 
corporate withdrawal from South Africa. Although economic sanctions did not cause the 
financial crisis, public pressure and sanctions complicated its resolution and contributed to the 
realization in South Africa that fundamental political reforms would be needed to achieve 
sustainable growth (Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, forthcoming). After more than two decades of 
sustained activism with limited success, the financial crisis coupled with the end of the Cold War 
contributed to rapidly accelerating reforms and the fall of the white minority regime in 1994. 
 Besides providing precedent and people, the anti-apartheid story contains potential 
lessons for the anti-sweatshop activists. First, it underscores the fact that corporations typically 
respond only to external pressures that tangibly affect their bottom line. Most multinationals in 
South Africa were willing to adopt the Sullivan Principles because it was a relatively 
inexpensive way to protect their reputation while maintaining profitable operations. The 
accelerated pace of withdrawal in the mid-1980s was largely due either to conditions in South 
Africa that increased risk or reduced profitability, such as the financial crisis, or to government 
actions that had similar effects, such as the denial of credits for taxes paid in South Africa. 
 Second, perhaps the most important roles that the anti-apartheid activists played were in 
terms of symbolic and leverage politics. Anti-apartheid activists within South Africa supported 
and gained politically from sanctions. The support of external activists bolstered the ANC and 
their allies psychologically and, when the white regime finally came to the table, sanctions gave 
the ANC leverage in negotiating the terms of the transition. In addition, by influencing the 
 49
American and Commonwealth governments, the activists contributed to the sense of isolation 
and growing hopelessness about the future among whites in South Africa. 
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Box 2  Environmental Labeling and the Forest Stewardship Council 
 The FSC is an independent nonprofit NGO that accredits certifying organizations who, in 
turn, monitor member companies and certify forest products as being in compliance with the 
FSC’s code of ten principles for sustainable forestry. It was founded in October 1993 when the 
World Wildlife Fund joined with the Rainforest Alliance (a New York-based NGO with its own 
certification scheme) and representatives of forest companies and retailers, including B&Q 
(Britain’s largest home improvement retail chain), to negotiate a code and procedures for 
certifying compliance.31  The organization is transparent and democratic, with a governing body 
composed of three separate “chambers” with representatives of social, environmental, and 
economic interests. Although more radical environmental groups criticized the FSC for having 
corporations as members, several of the most prominent environmental activist groups joined, 
including Greenpeace International, the Sierra Club, and various chapters of Friends of the Earth. 
With their support and that of a few large retailers, FSC quickly became the market leader in 
forest product certification. It created a standard code, established credibility through 
independent monitoring, and provided consumers with readily available information by creating 
an easily recognized logo to mark certified products.32 
 In its first seven years, the FSC accredited nine “certification bodies” in six countries, has 
seven applications pending, and has certified nearly 20 million hectares in 33 countries, 
including 1.8 million in the United States. To keep up the pressure on the demand side, NGOs 
convinced Ikea, the world’s largest furniture retailer with 1999 sales of $8.5 billion, and Home 
Depot, the largest do-it-yourself company with 1997 sales of $24 billion, to phase-out wood 
products from old-growth forests that have not been certified.33  In 1998, under pressure from its 
customers, the largest forestry company in British Columbia, MacMillan Bloedel, announced 
 51
that it would no longer clear-cut old-growth forests in coastal BC. The following spring, two 
other BC forestry companies followed suit (Hoberg 1999). In addition, there are a number of 
national initiatives to form “forest and trade networks,” which have evolved from “buyers’ 
clubs” with the aim of “span[ning] the industry from forest owner to architect, manufacturer to 
retailer,” to promote FSC certification (www.panda.org/tradefair2000/ network.htm; last visited 
June 9, 2000). As of June 2000, there were networks in North America, Australia, the Nordic 
countries and eight other European countries involving more than 500 member companies. 
 The FSC example shows that activist-inspired, consumer-based campaigns can contribute 
to changes in market behavior, but it also underscores the limitations to such campaigns. First, as 
the WWF concedes, the area of certified forest is “modest” and the supply of certified products is 
“limited.” The 20 million certified hectares compares to an average 11.3 million hectares lost 
each year to deforestation out of a total 3.5 billion hectares of global forest cover. Only around 3 
million hectares are certified in tropical forests areas of the developing world, where 
deforestation is of the most concern.34 Second, the market impact of certification is difficult to 
assess because there are no data on the volume or share of wood products from certified forests. 
Third, FSC credibility depends on the ability to verify the chain of custody, which is most easily 
done when there are relatively small numbers of large buyers and sellers. Small forest owners 
complain that certification is too expensive and the standards inappropriate for them. Fourth, the 
impact of certification is limited because slash and burn agriculture and the use of wood for fuel 
are much greater threats to forests in many countries. 
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EXHIBIT 1: Survey Findings on Consumers Expressed Desire for Labor Standards 
 
 
Marymount University Center for Ethical Concerns  
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1999 
 
Would avoid shopping at retailer that sold garments made in sweatshop  
 
   78 % 
 
   79 % 
 
   75 % 
 
More inclined to shop at stores working to prevent sweatshops 
 
66  
 
63  
 
65  
 
Willing to pay $1 more for $20 garment guaranteed made in legitimate shop 
 
 84   
 
83  
 
86  
 
Most responsible for preventing sweatshops 
     Manufacturers 
     Retailers 
     Both 
 
 
76 
  7 
10 
 
 
70 
10 
15 
 
 
65 
11 
19 
 
What would most help you avoid buying sweatshop clothes 
     Fair-Labor label 
     Sweat-Shop List   
 
 
56 
33 
 
University of Maryland Program on International Policy Attitudes 
 
 
 
Feel moral obligation to make effort to ensure that people in other countries 
producing goods we buy do not have to work in harsh or unsafe conditions  
 
 
   74% 
 
Willing to pay $25 for $20 garment that is certified not made in sweatshop 
 
76 
 
Find arguments for/against labor standards convincing 
      Standards will eliminate jobs 
      Standards interfere with national sovereignty 
      Low standards give unfair advantage 
      Low standards are immoral 
 
 
37 
41 
74 
83 
 
US should not import products in violation of labor standards: 
     Products made by children (under force or without chance for school) 
     Made in unsafe / unhealthy places 
     Workers not allowed to unionize       
 
 
81 
77 
42 
 
Do not expect workers in foreign countries to make US wages, but expect countries to permit 
wages to rise by allowing unions / stopping child labor 
 
 
82 
 
Favor lowering barriers that limit clothing imports 
     Without hearing about costs of protection 
      After hearing costs of protection 
 
 
36 
53 
 
NBER Survey 
 
 
 
Consumers who say they care about the condition of workers who make the clothing they buy: 
     A lot 
     Somewhat 
     Only a little 
     Not at all / No Response 
 
 
   46% 
38 
  8 
  8 
 
Willing to pay more for an item if assured it was made under good working conditions 
     Amount willing to pay for $10 item 
     Amount willing to pay for $100 item 
 
     81 % 
$ 2.78 
$14.99 
 
At same price would choose alternative to t-shirt that students say is made under poor conditions 
 
 
    84% 
 
Would buy t-shirt made under poor conditions at average discount of   
 
$4.38 
 
Would not buy t-shirt made under poor conditions at all 
 
  65% 
 
Would pay more for t-shirt if came with assurance it was made under good conditions 
     Amount would pay, including those who did not offer to pay more 
 
  67%  
$0.87 
EXHIBIT 2: Estimated Demand Curves for Standards
Panel A
EXHIBIT 2  (continued)
Panel B
Panel C
EXHIBIT 3
The Chain of Production: Retail to Factory
EXHIBIT 4:  Incentives to Improve Standards
Prices, Costs
Level of Standards
P0
S**
P1
S*
Cost 1:  Firms will
      not change
Cost 3:  Firms choose S**
Cost 2:  Firms adopt S*
P0 = price before campaign
P1 = price after campaign
P1
So
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EXHIBIT 5: Characteristics of Student Anti-Sweatshop Activists  
A. Family Background 
 
Percentage 
 
Family Incomea 
     > 100,000 
     75-100,000 
     40-75,000 
     <40,000      
 
 
36  
22 
34 
8 
 
Political Attitudes of Parents 
     Progressive 
     Non-Partisan 
     Conservative 
 
     Involved in activism in college 
     Involved in activisim after college 
 
 
40 
27 
34 
 
29 
25 
 
Attitude of Others to Involvement 
     Parents:                      supportive 
                                        critical 
     Professors:                  supportive 
                                        critical  
     Uninvolved friends:   supportive 
                                        critical 
 
 
58 
11 
67 
24 
37 
 7 
 
B. Orientation Toward Social Activism 
 
Percentage  
 
Involved in activism before 
     High School 
     College 
Ever member of trade union 
Involved in Union Summer 
View self as politically committed activist (rather than apolitical do-gooder) 
 
 
52 
84 
31 
 9 
90 
 
% Rating Happiness as 9-10 on 10 point scale  
    All As 
     Living wage agreed to by corps and labor 
     Collegiate licensing companies agreed to full disclosure of factory locations 
     US unions increase share of work force 
     US cancels debt to third world countries 
 
 
48 
81 
69 
68 
74 
 
C. Allocation of Time  
 
 
 
Hours per Week on anti-sweatshop activities 
Hours per Week on other extra-curricular activities 
Hours per Week Studying 
Held Job 
     Hours if held job 
 
6.2 hrs 
10.3 hrs 
14.3 hrs 
40 % 
10.8 hrs 
 
If not involved, would spent time on 
     Another cause 
     Arts / Athletics 
     Socializing 
     Schoolwork 
     Sleep 
 
 
47 
36 
30 
27 
13 
 
D. Net Effect of Anti-Sweatshop Efforts 
 
Percentage  
 
Net Effect on (minus sign indicates negative):  
     Grades 
     Romantic Life 
     Friendships 
     Self-Confidence 
     Communication and Leadership Skills 
 
 
-16 
   3 
  46 
  76 
  83 
a.  For comparison, in the UCLA/ACE Freshman Survey, the proportion in these categories was:  
Family Income: > 100,000 - 16%; 75-100,000 - 12 %;  40-75,000 - 36%; <40,000 - 35%. 
 
Source: Tabulated from Survey of Student Activisits.  
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 EXHIBIT 6: Activists Compared to College Freshmen Overall 
 
 
 
 
Activists 
 
College Freshmen 
Overall 
 
Agree strongly or somewhat 
 
 
 
 
 
     Sex OK if people really like each other 
     Racial discrimination no longer a problem 
     Prohibit racist / sexist speech 
     Wealthy should pay more taxes 
 
     Disobey laws that violate values 
     Individual can do little to change society 
 
81 % 
 1 
38 
93 
 
74 
 9 
 
42 % 
20 
64 
63 
 
37 
33 
 
Deems essential or very important 
 
 
 
 
 
     Becoming authority in field 
     Raising family 
 
     Be very well off financially 
  
     Influence political structure 
     Be community leader 
 
52 
46 
 
6 
 
84 
70 
 
63 
73 
 
75 
 
17 
31 
 
Source: Tabulated from Activist Survey; ACE/UCLA survey of College Freshman, 1998.  
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EXHIBIT 7: Timeline of Anti-sweatshop Activities 
 
1990 Charles Kernaghan becomes director of National Labor Committee (NLC), founded in 1981 
to oppose Reagan administration policies in Central America. 
 
1992 Levi Strauss develops first code of conduct for suppliers following DOL suit against 
contractors in Saipan over wages, etc.; a year later, Levi’s announces plans to withdraw 
from China because of human rights situation there. 
 
1992 Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) introduces bill to bar imports of goods produced using child 
labor; reintroduces in each Congress until 1997 when he substitutes legislation calling for 
beefed up enforcement of existing law barring imports of goods produced with forced labor, 
including bonded or other forced child labor. 
 
1993 Wal-Mart publishes “Standards for Vendor Partners” after televised revelations regarding 
child labor use by suppliers in Bangladesh. 
 
August 1993 Clinton administration negotiates side agreements on labor and environment to accompany 
North American Free Trade Agreement. 
 
March 1995 Criticized for “de-linking” human rights from most-favored nation trade status for China 
in 1994, Clinton administration releases “model business principles” to encourage MNCs 
to adopt voluntary codes of conduct in operations around the world. 
 
August 1995 Department of Labor closes down sweatshop in El Monte California after discovering 
immigrant Thai workers being forced to work in slave-like conditions; incident gives 
momentum to Secretary Robert Reich’s campaign to combat sweatshops in US. 
 
December 1995 Under pressure from NLC, People of Faith Network over working conditions in El 
Salvador, The Gap agrees to independent monitoring of contractor facility. 
 
Spring 1996 NLC’s Kernaghan reveals Wal-Mart clothing endorsed by television personality Kathie 
Lee Gifford is produced under exploitative conditions, including child labor; Gifford vows 
to remedy situation; second scandal involving Gifford-endorsed clothing produced in 
American sweatshops in New York leads to collaboration with Labor Secretary Reich on 
his “No Sweat” campaign. 
 
August 1996 President Clinton, Secretary Reich announce creation of Apparel Industry Partnership, 
bringing together retailer/importers, unions, and NGOs to address sweatshop issue. 
 
March 1997 Management in a Phillips-Van Heusen (PVH) contract facility in Guatemala recognizes 
union, a first in that country’s apparel export sector. 
 
April 1997 AIP report outlines “Workplace Code of Conduct” and “Principles of Monitoring”. 
 
August 1997 Duke University students form group called Students Against Sweatshops; in subsequent 
months, movement grows on campuses across country eventually becoming United 
Students Against Sweatshops (USAS). 
 
October 1997 Council on Economic Priorities, following consultations with companies and NGOs, 
releases plan for “social audit” dealing with worker rights, creates agency to accredit 
compliance monitors. 
 
April 1998 Levi Strauss announces its return to China, arguing that the human rights situation has 
improved sufficiently “that the overall environment now is such that the risks to our 
Financial Times, 8 April 1998). 
 
Spring 1998 Under pressure from student group, Duke University releases code of conduct for 
suppliers of apparel licensed by Duke to display the university name or logo; code calls 
for independent monitoring of compliance, through the AIP if appropriate, and requires 
suppliers to disclose names and addresses of all contractors and plants involved in 
production of Duke-licensed apparel. 
 
Summer 1998 UNITE commits interns and resources to helping establish USAS on national basis. 
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EXHIBIT 7 (continued) 
 
August 1998 Joint NLC-USAS delegation visits Central America to meet workers, NGOs. 
 
November 1998 AIP agrees on creation of Fair Labor Association and accreditation of independent 
monitors to monitor compliance with code. 
 
December 1998 PVH closes unionized plant in Guatemala, saying it lost a major contract and has excess 
capacity; production will continue at nonunion plants elsewhere in Guatemala. 
 
January 1999 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, at World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, 
announces new “Global Compact” calling on the business community to respect basic 
principles on human rights, worker rights, and protection of the environment, but with no 
means for monitoring of compliance.  NGOs followed a year later with a ACitizens’ 
Compact” that rejects “partnership” between the UN and the business community and 
calls on the UN to make the principles mandatory with provisions for monitoring. 
 
Early 1999 USAS criticizes universities for signing on to FLA model for monitoring without 
consulting them; students hold sit-ins to demand stronger code at Duke, Georgetown, 
Wisconsin, North Carolina, and, for 226 hours, Arizona.  In April, USAS releases detailed 
report on inadequacies of FLA code and monitoring process and gives universities until 
October 15 to seek improvements. 
 
October 7, 1999 Under pressure from USAS and universities, Nike discloses locations of 41 factories 
producing licensed apparel for Duke, UNC, Georgetown, Michigan, and Arizona. 
 
October 19, 1999 After rejection by FLA of their suggestions and passage of the 6-month deadline with no 
other action by universities, USAS announces alternative Worker Rights Consortium and 
calls on universities to withdraw from FLA.  Brown University is the first to respond, 
announcing that it will join the WRC but also remain in the FLA; others, including Phil 
Knight alma mater University of Oregon follow. 
 
December 1999 Liz Claiborne agrees to independent monitoring at supplier facility in El Salvador; report 
published in full on International Labor Rights Fund website (see appendix). 
 
December 9, 1999 Philadelphia City Council calls on area colleges and universities to join WRC. 
 
Spring 2000 Nike retaliates against Brown and the University of Oregon for joining WRC, terminates 
contract to provide hockey products in one case and ends personal and corporate 
philanthropic relations in the other. 
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EXHIBIT 8  Key Differences among the Major Monitoring Initiatives 
 
 
Initiative 
 
Code content 
 
Monitoring procedures 
 
Disclosure 
 
Certification 
 
FLA Living wage: code notes “wages are 
essential to meeting employees’ basic 
needs,” but requires only that firms 
pay minimum or prevailing wage. 
 
Union rights:  requires employers to 
respect; separate section of charter 
notes that “special guidelines” may be 
required for countries where rights in 
code not respected in law or practice, 
prohibits factory owners using 
violence or requesting help of state 
authorities to discourage organizing. 
 
 
Corporate members must do internal 
monitoring, as well as submit to external 
monitoring by FLA - approved agencies.  
Initially, 30 percent of suppliers, suggested 
by member company based on certain “risk 
factors,” will be inspected periodically; the 
proportion eventually drops to 10 percent, 
which may be adjusted up or down 5 
percent.  FLA executive director can adjust 
list of factories if necessary or appropriate 
and sample size will also be reviewed for 
adequacy as monitoring proceeds. 
 
There are also procedures for third parties 
to submit complaints to the executive 
director for investigation. 
 
To encourage participation, FLA 
reimburses half of costs of external 
monitoring in first year, declining to 30 
percent in the third year and 0 in the fifth. 
 
Corporate members must submit a list of 
suppliers to the FLA but it remains 
confidential; FLA also does not release 
either internal or external monitoring 
reports, but will publish annual summary 
reports for each member company. 
Requires remediation of 
any violations found 
and report to FLA on 
steps taken both to 
resolve problems and to 
prevent recurrence in 
future. 
 
After monitoring system 
is tested and evaluated, 
it is anticipated that 
member companies will 
be able to use service 
mark for specific brands 
certified as in 
compliance with FLA 
code. 
Social 
Accountability 
International 
(previously 
CEPAA) 
Living wage:  Does not use this phrase 
but requires wages that “shall always 
be sufficient to meet basic needs of 
personnel and to provide some 
discretionary income;” the guidance 
document notes this may be above the 
prevailing wage and suggests criteria 
for calculating basic needs similar to 
those used for calculating living 
wages. 
 
Union rights:  Must be respected; 
where such rights are restricted by law, 
requires firms to “facilitate parallel 
Manufacturing plants must be certified by 
an accredited SAI monitor as in 
compliance with the SA8000 standard; 
accreditation and certification are good for 
three years with continuing surveillance of 
certified plants every six months.  The 
plant seeking certification selects an 
auditor from the list of SAI-accredited 
agencies and bears all costs of audit. 
 
SAI also provides a procedure for 
complaints and appeals of certification 
decisions by interested parties. 
 
List of certified firms is available on SAI 
website. 
 
Corporate members must release annually 
a public report describing objectives and 
reporting statistics on their progress in 
getting their suppliers certified. 
 
Accredited auditors do not release reports, 
but code requires that certified firms 
“establish and maintain procedures to 
communicate regularly to all interested 
parties data and other information 
regarding performance against the 
Requires remediation of 
any problems found and 
confirmation of same by 
auditor. 
 
Allows certified plants 
to display certificate in 
catalogue, on stationery, 
and in advertising but 
may not place label on 
product. 
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means of independent and free 
association and bargaining for all such 
personnel.” 
 
 
Corporations involved in retail sales can 
be SAI members if they commit to 
encouraging suppliers to become certified 
and to “eventually” phase out relations 
with substandard suppliers. 
 
requirements of this document, including, 
but not limited to, the results of 
management reviews and monitoring 
activities.” 
 
 
WRC Living wage: code requires payment of 
a “dignified living wage” but other 
documents allow universities to 
postpone implementation until further 
research is completed. 
 
Union rights: requires licensees to 
respect and prohibits any form of 
intimidation, retaliation or the barring 
of organizers from premises. 
 
In countries where laws conflict with 
rights in code, licensees are 
nevertheless to take action to “achieve 
full compliance” and license 
agreements may not be renewed for 
goods produced in countries where 
“compliance with the employment 
standards in the Code is deemed 
impossible.” 
 
“Verification model” relies on disclosure 
and “spot investigatory capacity” to 
enforce code.  WRC will create WRC 
Agency to oversee investigations of 
compliance but will not permit licensees to 
be members or to influence process in any 
way.  Agency, funded by university 
licensing revenue, will work with local 
groups that are trusted by workers to 
investigate complaints. 
Requires licensees to disclose name and 
location of all factories producing licensed 
apparel, as well as “objective measures” of 
working conditions, including wages and 
benefits, work hours, etc.  Also requires 
licensees to ensure access on demand to 
company records and workplace. 
Licensees are threatened 
with termination of 
contract if suppliers not 
in compliance with code 
but no licensee will be 
certified as in 
compliance because not 
possible to monitor all 
plants all the time. 
 
 
Sources: Based on organizing documents from the groups, most of which are available on their websites: fairlabor.org for FLA; cepaa.org for SAI; workersrights.org for WRC. For 
other comparisons, see also, “Assessment of the Fair Labor Association Agreement” on the International Labor Rights Fund website (laborrights.org), “A renewed analysis of the 
Fair Labor Association...” on the United Students Against Sweatshops website (umich.edu/~sole/usas/), the response on the FLA website, and the report by the University of 
Michigan Advisory Committee on Labor Standards and Human Rights, http://www.umich.edu/~newsinfo/BG/humright.html. 
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EXHIBIT 9: Assessment of Selected Anti-Sweatshop Campaigns (italics indicates member of FLA) 
 
Company or 
Campaign  
 
Influence on Procedures Influence on Behavior Assessment* Comments 
Disney None:   has a code but refused to respond 
to NLC campaign on Haiti (except by 
allowing one licensee to withdraw) 
 
None detected. -1 to 0 Young children difficult to mobilize and 
parents reluctant to say no. 
Levi Strauss Early promoter of code; traditionally 
opposed independent monitoring but 
recently joined FLA, ETI in Europe. 
In 1993, announced withdrawal from China 
because of human rights abuses, later 
stopped sourcing in Burma 
3 Levi Strauss has always promoted itself as 
caring about workers in US and abroad; 
but sales down, profits under pressure in 
recent years; froze withdrawal from China 
in 1996, announced expansion in 1998, 
closed plants in US and Western Europe.  
 
Liz Claiborne, 
Inc. 
Accepted independent NGO monitoring at 
contract facility in El Salvador 
Shortfalls identified and publicly reported; 
need to verify remediation 
2-3 Experiment not replicated but presumably 
will be through FLA  
Nike Has been much more open; though 
criticized, hired Andrew Young group to 
monitor facilities in East Asia; revealed 
locations of factories producing licensed 
university apparel 
Like Reebok  is eliminating toxic solvents 
from production process; has improved 
ventilation in factories; raised wages 
above official minimum wage after Asian 
financial crisis  
 
2-3 Criticism of Young report (nothing on 
wages); Corpwatch releases leaked Ernst 
& Young audit showing violations of 
Vietnamese law, but concludes plant in 
compliance with Nike code of conduct. 
Phillips-Van 
Heusen 
Asked Human Rights Watch to 
investigate complaints at Guatemalan 
facility 
Following Human Rights Watch report, 
recognized union in Guatemala maquila 
1-2 CEO Klatsky on board of HRW; direct 
ownership stake in facility. 
 
Shut plant after union recognized 
Reebok  Early adoption of code; recently elicited 
and published NGO report on factories 
producing 2/3 of Reebok footwear in 
Indonesia 
Report also included steps taken by 
contractors to address health and safety 
problems identified in NGO report; ; raised 
wages above official minimum wage after 
Asian financial crisis; like Nike is 
eliminating toxic solvents from production 
process 
 
3 Reebok letter accompanying NGO report 
says too expensive to replicate elsewhere, 
though hopes to apply lessons; critics 
target failure to independently inspect all 
factories producing for Reebok and for 
not doing enough on wages. 
Starbucks In 1995, following picketing/leafleting at 
stores by US/Guatemala Labor Education 
Project, announces a code of conduct for 
coffee pickers in Guatemala, elsewhere. 
 
Announced action plan to assist small-
scale coffee producers improve quality 
and expand overseas markets but takes no 
steps to monitor code implementation. 
 
2 Starbucks promotes itself as socially-
conscious company, provides benefits to 
part-time employees, donates profits to 
charity (largest direct corporate 
contributor to CARE according to 
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In 2000, pre-empts planned protests at 
stores in Washington, DC and elsewhere 
by announcing it will buy and sell Fair 
Trade Coffee. 
As of Fall 2000, Fair Trade coffee beans 
are available in selected Starbucks stores. 
promotional material in store). 
The Gap Accepted independent NGO monitoring at 
contract facility in El Salvador 
Improvements in covered facilities; but 
still no union recognition 
1-2 Experiment has not been replicated in 
other facilities and The Gap has refused to 
settle case regarding sweatshop practices 
in suppliers in Saipan that would provide 
for independent monitoring by Verite, as 
well as cash settlement for workers. 
 
Wal-Mart and 
Kathie Lee 
Wal-Mart adopted code early and KLG 
agreed to ensure independent monitoring 
to enforce code in facilities supplying 
KLG-label clothing.  Publicity contributed 
to creation of AIP but, while KLG joined, 
Wal-Mart did not. 
None detected? 1 Independent monitoring has not occurred 
and allegations about facilities in China 
and elsewhere continue; Wal-Mart also a 
defendant in Saipan sweatshop case. 
 
* From 1 for negative outcome to 5 for very successful. 
ENDNOTES
                                                          
1
 Comparing the Marymount and PIPA surveys, we see that a higher premium on a $20 item, $5
versus $1, reduces the number of people who say they would buy the product made under good
conditions.  In this range, moreover, the demand would appear to be modestly inelastic.  Total
revenues would rise with the increase in price from $21 to $25, but, since purchasers would fall
from 85 percent of persons to 75 percent, revenues would still be maximized at the $20 price.
2
 Springfield Telemarketing conducted the survey for us.
3
 We did not ask if they would take the good if we paid them.
4
 Due to a coding problem, this estimate may be too low and we are having the survey firm check
the responses here.  When corrected, the number may be somewhat higher than that in the text,
but only moderately so.
5
 Some respondents refused to answer these questions and some gave inconsistent answers –
saying, for instance, that they would buy the cheaper product no matter what and then saying they
would pay extra for the product made under better conditions.  We made the conservative
assumption that anyone who refused to answer or who gave an inconsistent response would not
pay a premium for a product made under good conditions or would buy the product under poor
conditions.  But had we deleted these observations, our results would be qualitatively the same.
6
 Since we did not specify the conditions under which the alternative product was made, this is an
inference from responses to the two sets of questions.  The design that would provide a test of
this inference would be to ask consumers to compare a product made under good conditions with
one made under positively bad conditions (at varying prices) and a product made under good
conditions with one made under unknown conditions.  Our analysis compared bad conditions
with unknown conditions and good conditions with unknown conditions.
7
 Under pressure from Global Exchange and other activist groups, Starbucks agreed to sell “Fair
Trade” coffee beginning in Fall 2000, with guarantees that the coffee comes from cooperatives
where farmers earn a reasonable price.  This could provide the natural experiment.
8
 The most famous experimental game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma differs from the standards
problem since it requires both persons to cooperate, but it shows the same thing: that many
people do not follow the pure maximizing strategy.  The rational response in a fixed period PD
game is to defect, but in fact people frequently choose to cooperate.
9
 With suitable interpretation of variables, votes rather than prices, for instance, the same model
applies to the potential catalytic effect of activists on governments.
10
 Beyond that point the marginal increase in price is less than the marginal increase in cost while
before that point the marginal increase in price exceeds the marginal cost.
11
 We distributed 45 surveys at the USAS National Organizing Conference in July and sent
emails to an additional 140 activists listed on the USAS listserver or suggested by respondents.
We obtained 39 responses from persons at the Conference and 55 from those sent the email
instrument, giving 94 responses and an overall response rate of slightly over 50 percent.
                                                                                                                                                                                          
12
 The questions were identical because we asked the activists questions from the American
Freshman survey regarding attitudes and goals.
13
 But sweatshops are also coming back in the United States; Weil (2000) and Duong (2000).
14
 This is a model not addressed here, in which activists try to organize alternative markets by
linking consumers in rich countries to producers in poor countries who are paid premium prices
for indigenous products such as coffee, tea, bananas, or local handicrafts.  In addition to its work
with the FLA, the International Labor Rights Fund is one such group; others are listed in the
appendix..
15
 An ILO report (1998) on corporate codes and social labels surveyed 200, while the Investor
Responsibility Research Center (Varley 1998) collected 121 codes from a survey of the S&P 500
companies and 80 retailers. Activists recognize that their main success has been in putting labor
standards on the world policy agenda.  In our survey of USAS activists, 94 percent rated their
campaign as very or somewhat successful in increasing public awareness and 90 percent rated
their campaign as very/somewhat successful in increasing student activism.
16
 PVH’s Bruce Klatsky demonstrates a strong personal commitment to human rights through his
work with Human Rights Watch and Kathie Lee Gifford demonstrated concern for the well-being
of children through her charitable contributions to children’s causes.
17
 For an alternative view of the benefits of “open standards” and competition among monitoring
agencies, see Sabel, O’Rourke, and Fung (2000).
18
 Of course, given the paucity of such products in the market today, there is little cost attached to
the promise and the true test will come when more final consumers have the choice before them.
19
 Concerns about the effects of codes on homeworkers were raised by Southern NGOs in a
workshop organized by NGOs participating in the Ethical Trade Initiative in the United Kingdom
(see www.cafod.org.uk/policyviews.htm).  Concerns have also been raised about the impact of
the agreement to create stitching centers for the production of soccer balls in Sialkot, Pakistan.
Shifting production from homes to centralized locations facilitates monitoring of the agreement
to end child labor, but makes it difficult for some adult women to earn income because they
cannot leave home (see the Clean Clothes Campaign website at www.cleanclothes.org).
20
 For example, Columbia University Professor Jagdish Bhagwati argued in The Financial Times
(May 2, 2000) that, “[A] minuscule minority of students who are captive to unions such as the
apparel industry's UNITE, have used the language of ‘social responsibility’ towards the poor
countries, to advance an agenda, both illegitimate and narrow, that will in fact harm the very
countries and workers they claim to assist.”  Bhagwati also served on the steering committee of
the Academic Consortium on International Trade, which in September 2000 delivered a letter
from academic economists to the presidents of universities targeted by USAS expressing similar,
though less virulent, concerns.
21
 http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/.  “A policy of good jobs in principle, but no jobs in practice,
might assuage our consciences, but it is no favor to its alleged beneficiaries.”
22
 See Lynda Yanz, “Constructing Codes from the Ground Up” in Carnegie Council on Ethics
and International Affairs, Human Rights Dialogue, Fall 2000, series 2, no 4, p 6
                                                                                                                                                                                          
23
 See http://www.lafollette.wisc.edu/livingwage/ Final_Report/report.htm.  A considered defense
of a living wage can also be found in a student dissent to the May 2000 University of Michigan
task force report on labor standards
  
“The Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Labor
Standards and Human Rights,”  University of Michigan, May 2000.  Available on the University
of Michigan website.
24
 Most child labor, for example, occurs in agriculture, construction, and domestic services,
where anti-sweatshop campaigns cannot readily reach.
25
 Medea Benjamin, Interview,  Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, Human
Rights Dialogue, Fall 2000, series 2, no 4, p 7
26
 A conference report from the workshop is available from the Catholic Agency for Overseas
Development (CAFOD), at www.cafod.org.uk/policyviews.htm.
27
 The text of the bilateral agreement may be found on the Department of Commerce’s Market
Access and Compliance website (http://www.mac.doc.gov).
28
 See the NLC’s campaign to help workers at the Mil Colores workers plant in Nicaragua.
29
 For an excellent history of the anti-apartheid movement, see Massie (1997).
30
 A description of the FSC may be found at http:/www.panda.org/forests4life/certify_fsc.cfm
(last visited on June 9, 2000).  See also the FSC homepage at www.fscoax.org.
31
 The World Wildlife Fund is now trying to replicate the FSC’s success with a Marine
Stewardship Council to certify fish products as having been sustainably harvested [see
www.msc.org].
32
 IKEA asked its suppliers of solid wood products to ensure that none of their wood came from
uncertified old-growth forests by September 2000.  A second phase will extend the same
requirement to suppliers of other wood products, including paper, cardboard, and furniture made
with particleboard, but no target date has been set.  See Greenpeace, November 24, 1999
(available at www.greenpeace.org/%7Eforests/reports/Re-Source/ikeaarticle.html last visited,
June 8, 2000). IKEA sales are from their website, www.ikea.com, last visited June 8, 2000;
Home Depot sales are from Journal of Commerce, November 12, 1993, 9A.
33
 The FSC website (www.fscoax.org) has a list of certified areas; see also UN Food and
Agricultural Organization’s annual report for 1999.  Recognizing the lagging progress in
developing countries, the World Wildlife Fund joined the World Bank in an alliance to promote
sustainable forestry management globally, with a target of 200 certified hectares by 2005, evenly
divided between temperate and tropical forests.
Appendix Exhibit A: Transnational Labor Rights Activist Organizations
Specialization Year formed Orientation
American Friends Service Comm US; Mexico 1917 religious
  (http://www.afsc.org/)
Asian Immig Women Advocates US Asians 1983 ethnic
  (http://www.corpwatch.org/feature/hitech/aiwa.html)
Asian Law Caucus US Asians 1972 ethnic
  (http://www.asianlawcaucus.org/)
As You Sow Foundation shareholder activism 1992 do-gooder
  (http://www.asyousow.org/index40.htm)
Bangor Clean Clothes Campaign code of conduct 1997 do-gooder
  (http://www.bairnet.org/organizations/pica/cleanclo.htm)
Campaign for Labor Rights general 1995 left
  (http://summersault.com/~agj/clr/)
Coalition for Justice in Maquiladoras Mexico 1989 do-gooder
CISPES El Salvador 1980 left
  (http://www.cispes.org/)
Co-Op America general 1982 do-gooder
  (http://www.coopamerica.org/)
Council for Economic Priorities code/monitoring 1969 do-gooder
  (http://www.cepnyc.org/)
Edenwald Gunhill Center Nike 1997 left
Fair Trade Federation codes/labels 1996 do-gooder
  (http://www.fairtradefederation.org/)
Free the Children USA children 1995 do-gooder
  (http://www.freethechildren.org/main/index.html)
Global Exchange general 1988 left
 (http://www.globalexchange.org/)
Global Kids children 1989 do-gooder
 (http://www.globalkidsinc.org/)
Human Rights Watch Mexico, Guatamala 1978 do-gooder
 (http://www.hrw.org/)
Human Rights for Workers general 1996 do-gooder
  (http://www.senser.com/)
Interfaith Center for Corp Resp shareholder activism 1971 religious
  (http://www.domini.com/ICCR.html)
International Labor Rights Fund football; Rugmark 1986 do-gooder
  (http://www.laborrights.org/)
Justice Do it NIKE! Nike 1996?
La Mujer Obrera El Paso left
Labor Defense Network sweatshops 1997 do-gooder
LA Jewish Comm for Worker Justice US? 1997 religious
National Consumer League,
  Child Labor Coalition children 1989 do-gooder
  (http://www.natlconsumersleague.org/)
National Labor Committee Central America 1981 left
  (http://www.nlcnet.org/)
NY State Labor-Religion Coalition codes 1980 religious
  (http://www.labor-religion.org/)
Nicaragua Network Education Fund Nicaragua 1980 left
  (http://summersault.com/~agj/nicanet/index.html)
People of Faith Network general religious
  (http://www.users.cloud9.net/~pofn/)
Press for Change Nike left
  (http://www.nikeworkers.org/)
Resource Center of the Americas Latin America 1991 do-gooder
  (http://www.Americas.org/)
Rugmark Foundation USA child labor/carpets 1995 do-gooder
(  http://www.rugmark.org/)
STITCH Guatamala 1992 left
Support Committee Mexico do-gooder
  for Maquiladora Workers
  (http://enchantedwebsites.com/maquiladora/index.html)
Sweatshop Watch general (mainly US) 1995 do-gooder
  (http://www.sweatshopwatch.org/)
Transnational Resource Nike 1996 do-gooder
  and Action Center (Corporate Watch)
  (http://www.corpwatch.org/)
Transfair America coffee;Starbucks 1996 do-gooder
  (http://www.transfairusa.org/)
UNITE (union) apparel 1994 left
  (http://www.uniteunion.org/)
US/Guatemala Labor Education Central America 1997? left
 (Now US Labor Education in the Americas Project)
  (http://usleap.org/)
USAS college apparel 1997 left
  (http://www.umich.edu/~sole/usas/)
Verite China, Asia 1995 do-gooder
  (http://www.verite.org/)
Vietnam Labor Watch NIKE, Vietnam 1996 do-gooder
  (http://www.saigon.com/~nike/)
Witness for Peace Central America 1983 left
  (http://www.witnessforpeace.org/)
Witness Rights Alert human rights groups 1992 do-gooder
  (http://www.oddcast.com/witness/)
Source: Global Exchange, A directory of US anti-sweatshop organizations; internet search.
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